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## OF CRIMES AND CRIMINALS *THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY IN BRITAIN*

*David Garland\**

### INTRODUCTION: THE CONTINGENT CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGY

This chapter presents an interpretation of the historical development of criminology in Britain. Any such history is inevitably a contentious undertaking, entailing theoretical choices and rhetorical purposes as well as the selection and arrangement of historical materials. Whether they acknowledge it or not, histories of the discipline necessarily come up against fundamental issues—What is ‘criminology’? What are its central features? How are its conceptual and historical boundaries identified? In what institutional, political, or cultural contexts should it be situated? It may therefore be useful to begin by outlining some of the theoretical assumptions that underpin the interpretation offered here.

I take criminology to be a specific genre of discourse and inquiry about crime—a genre that has developed in the modern period and that can be distinguished from other ways of talking and thinking about criminal conduct. Thus, for example, criminology’s claim to be an empirically grounded, scientific undertaking sets it apart from moral and legal discourses, while its focus upon crime differentiates it from other social scientific genres, such as the sociology of deviance and control, whose objects of study are broader and not defined by the criminal law. Since the middle years of the twentieth century, criminology has also been increasingly marked off from other discourses by the trappings of a distinctive disciplinary identity, with its own journals, professional associations, professorships, and institutes. One of the concerns of this essay will be to try to explain how such a discipline came to exist as an accredited specialism, supported by universities and governments alike.

My broad historical argument will be that modern criminology grew out of the

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convergence of two quite separate enterprises—'the governmental project' and 'the Lombrosian project'—which together provided a social and an intellectual rationale for the subject. By talking about a 'governmental project' I mean to refer to the long series of empirical inquiries, which, since the eighteenth century, have sought to enhance the efficient and equitable administration of justice by charting the patterns of crime and monitoring the practice of police and prisons. This tradition of inquiry was eventually to become a major part of the criminological enterprise and to provide criminology with its central claim to social utility. The 'Lombrosian project', in contrast, refers to a form of inquiry which aims to develop an etiological, explanatory science, based on the premise that criminals can somehow be scientifically differentiated from non-criminals.<sup>1</sup> Although each of these projects underwent important revisions during the twentieth century, and the situation of criminology has been significantly altered by its entry into the universities, I will suggest that the discipline continues to be structured by the sometimes competing, sometimes converging, claims of these two programmes. One pole of the discipline pulls its practitioners towards an ambitious (and, I have argued elsewhere—Garland 1985b—deeply flawed) theoretical project seeking to build a science of causes. The other exerts the pragmatic force of a policy-oriented, administrative project, seeking to use science in the service of management and control. Criminologists have sometimes sought to overcome this tension by rejecting one project in favour of the other—either giving up the search for causes in favour of a direct policy orientation, or else disengaging from governmental concerns in the name of a pure (or a critical) science. However, the combination of the two projects seems essential to criminology's claim to be sufficiently useful and sufficiently scientific to merit the status of an accredited, state-sponsored, academic discipline.

The coming together of these two projects was by no means inevitable. The historical record suggests that it took several decades for criminal justice officials to accept that the Lombrosian search for the causes of crime had any relevance to their administrative tasks, and, in fact, Lombroso's criminology had to be extensively modified before it could be of service to policy-makers and state authorities. Beyond that, the very idea of a science devoted to 'the criminal' seems in retrospect to have been something of an historical accident, originally prompted by a claim that was quickly

<sup>1</sup> I use the concept of a 'project' here to characterize an emergent tradition of inquiry that, despite a degree of variation, shares a cluster of aims and objectives. The 'governmental' project refers to those inquiries that direct their attention to the problems of governing crime and criminals. Studies which fall within this tradition are not necessarily official, state-sponsored studies, although, from the nineteenth century onwards, the state came to dominate work of this kind. Nor are these inquiries necessarily focused upon state practices (such as criminal laws, police, prisons, etc.), since the governance of crime and criminals also occurs through 'private' institutions such as the family, boys' clubs, settlement houses, and so on. As I discuss later, the study of crime and criminal justice practices was not at first separate from a much broader concern with the rational governance of the population in all its aspects. (On the concept of governmentality, see Foucault 1979; Burchell *et al.* 1991; Garland 1997.) The 'Lombrosian' project refers to that tradition of inquiry, begun by Lombroso, which aims to differentiate the criminal individual from the non-criminal. By naming the etiological project in this way I wish to emphasize the continuity in scientific objective which runs from Lombroso to the present, rather than to suggest a continuity of method or of substantive analysis: most etiological studies of the twentieth century de-emphasized the biological determinants which Lombroso took to be fundamental.



discredited: namely, that 'the criminal type' was an identifiable anthropological entity. Were it not for the contingency of that intellectual event there might never have been any distinctive criminological science, or any independent discipline. As an historical counterfactual, it is perfectly plausible to imagine that crime and criminals could have remained integral concerns of mainstream sociology and psychiatry, and that 'criminological' research undertaken for government purposes could have developed without the need of a university specialism of that name. If this is so, and criminology has a contingent rather than a necessary place in the halls of science, then its history becomes all the more relevant to an understanding of the discipline.

In the light of the assumptions and arguments I have outlined here, history becomes essential to an understanding of the modern criminological enterprise. If we are to understand the central topics that criminology has marked out as its own, if we are to understand the discipline's relation to institutional practices and concerns, if we are to understand some of the key terms and conceptions that structure the discourse, then we will have to ask genealogical questions about the constitution of this science and examine the historical processes that led to the emergence of an accredited disciplinary specialism. Moreover, the kind of historical inquiry required is one that is sensitive to context and contingency, and to the relation between intellectual developments and the social practices out of which they emerge. If my claim is correct, and criminology is a product of the convergence of certain ideas and interests, in a particular institutional context, then its history cannot be treated, as it so often is, as the gradual unfolding of a science that was always destined to appear. Such is the prevalence of this kind of history that it may be worth discussing the shortcomings of received accounts, before going on to sketch an alternative approach.

### TEXTBOOK HISTORIES

Criminology's history is most often presented in the form of a preface. It appears, usually in a few compressed and standardized pages, as the opening section of a book or article, introducing the reader to the subject and placing the author's text within a longer tradition. Sometimes the prefatory history has a job to do, providing the reader with enough historical understanding to appreciate the significance and provenance of the text that follows. At other times it is merely decorative—a routine flourish with little real purpose beyond getting started in a way that has come to be expected of authors. Ironically, this routine repetition of conventional historical wisdom can have an influence quite out of keeping with its value as scholarship. The telling and retelling of the standard historical tale is a most effective way of persuading the discipline's recruits that whatever else may be contested, this much, at least, can be taken for granted.

Occasionally, textbooks, research monographs, or critical studies make a feature of their historical introductions, offering a more extensive (and usually more tendentious) account of the subject's history, which acts as a kind of framing device for subsequent arguments.<sup>2</sup> On these occasions, history becomes a way of conducting

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., the historical introductions to the following: Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973; Morris 1957; Matza 1964.

theoretical debate by other means. The recovery of a lost theoretical tradition, the reinterpretation of the subject's early history, claims and counter-claims about the true 'founders' of the discipline, or critical summaries of previous patterns of thought, are all ways in which the subject's history gets drafted into current controversies and made to do duty for one side or the other.<sup>3</sup>

The history of the discipline has, on a few occasions, formed the central subject matter for a book or an article. Most of these excursions into historical criminology are minor attempts to attribute importance to a particular author whose influence upon the subject is felt to have been slighted,<sup>4</sup> but some historical writings have more ambitious intentions. Books such as Mannheim's *Pioneers in Criminology* (1960), or Radzinowicz's *Ideology and Crime* (1966)—both published by leading figures in the process of discipline-building—played an important role in shaping the contours and self-consciousness of the discipline, and sought to enhance its status by invoking a distinguished Enlightenment past and a progressive scientific mission.<sup>5</sup> The collection entitled *The History of British Criminology* (Rock 1988a)—edited by one of the sociologists who helped remake British criminology in the 1960s and 1970s—professes similar discipline-forming ambitions, aiming to introduce new generations of criminologists to a revised history more in keeping with contemporary interests and understandings. It is not just the textbooks that have to be adjusted when a discipline changes; history must also be rewritten.

The received history of the discipline, often simplified into a tale of icons and demons (Beccaria, Lombroso, Burt, Radzinowicz . . .), a few key distinctions (classicism, positivism, radicalism . . .), and an overarching narrative in which ideological error is gradually displaced by the findings of science (e.g., the myth of the born criminal and its subsequent debunking), plays a small but significant role in shaping the horizons and reference points of contemporary criminology. A discipline's practitioners work with a sense of where their subject has come from and where it is going, which issues are settled and which are still live, who are the exemplars to imitate and who are the anathemas to be avoided. Perhaps most importantly, the received history provides practitioners with a standard-issue kit of collective terms and shared values. Thus, for example, anyone who learned about the discipline's history from the textbooks of the 1970s and 1980s would find it hard to identify with the methods and aspirations of 'positivism', even though this term was broad enough to include

<sup>3</sup> Laub and Sampson 1991 is a good example. The authors of this article develop a sophisticated historical account that aims to explain the disappearance of the work of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck from the canon of contemporary criminology. Their revisionist historical account serves to reassert the importance of the Gluecks' contribution and its central themes (age and crime; criminal careers and longitudinal research; stability of crime and deviance; social control and the family). In doing so, it operates as a corrective to the historical record, but also as a prolegomenon to a major work of Laub and Sampson that builds upon the Gluecks' research findings. See Sampson and Laub 1993.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Savitz *et al.* 1977; also Lyell 1913, Levin and Lindesmith 1937.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the rhetorical, discipline-building character of Radzinowicz's *Ideology and Crime*, see Garland 2002.



virtually the whole discipline prior to the rise of 'labelling' theories and the associated anti-positivist critiques.<sup>6</sup>

The standard textbook account of criminology's history begins with the writings of criminal law reformers in the eighteenth century, particularly Beccaria, Bentham, Romilly, and Howard. These writers are said to have characterized the offender as a rational, free-willed actor who engages in crime in a calculated, utilitarian way and is therefore responsive to deterrent, proportionate penalties of the kind that the reformers preferred. This 'classical school of criminology', as it is usually called, was subsequently challenged, in the late nineteenth century, by writers of the 'positivist school' (Lombroso, Ferri, and Garofalo are usually cited) who adopted a more empirical, scientific approach to the subject, and investigated 'the criminal' using the techniques of psychiatry, physical anthropology, anthropometry, and other new human sciences. The positivist school claimed to have discovered evidence of the existence of 'criminal types' whose behaviour was determined rather than chosen and for whom treatment rather than punishment was appropriate. Subsequent research refuted or modified most of the specific claims of Lombroso, and restored the credibility of some of the 'classicist' ideas he opposed, but the project of a scientific criminology had been founded, and this enterprise continues, in a more diverse and sophisticated way, today.

This standard textbook history is, of course, broadly accurate—it would be very surprising if it were not. But the broad sweep of its narrative and the resounding simplicity of its generic terms can be profoundly misleading if they are taken as real history, rather than as a kind of foundational myth, developed not for historical purposes but for heuristic ones.

#### MISLEADING CATEGORIES

A problematic feature of these histories is their uncritical use of key terms that then subsequently enter into standard criminological discourse in an equally unself-conscious way. The term 'classicism', to take an important example, is used as a generic term to denote the criminology of Beccaria and Bentham, and eighteenth-century thought more generally. It is also used, by extension, to describe modern theories that affirm the rational, free-willed character of offenders' decision-making processes (see Roshier 1989). But, despite this conventional usage, it actually makes little sense to claim that these eighteenth-century thinkers possessed a 'criminology', given that they made no general distinction between the characteristics of criminals and non-criminals, and had no conception of research on crime and criminals as a distinctive form of inquiry. To use the term 'classical criminology' to characterize eighteenth-century thought seriously misrepresents the nature of these writings and forcibly assimilates them to a project that was not invented until a century later.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., the discussions of 'positivism' in Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973 and in Matza 1964. The tradition of 'positivist criminology' has been re-evaluated and reaffirmed in the USA (see Gottfredson and Hirschi 1987), and in Britain, some of its sternest critics have modified their views and realigned themselves with some of its central concerns. For a discussion of the changing relationship between 'radical criminology' and 'positivism', see Young 1988.

The notion that these various writers all maintained the same view of the offender (as a rational, free-willed actor) is also a distortion, derived from the polemics of late nineteenth-century positivists rather than from a reading of the eighteenth-century texts. There are, for example, quite major differences between authors such as Bentham and Howard on the questions of human nature and freedom of choice; and Beccaria, as a good Lockean empiricist, viewed human character and conduct as shaped by sense impressions and habit as well as by free will and reason.<sup>7</sup> Other eighteenth-century writers on crime approached the question from a quite different perspective, stressing the social conditions that shaped individual conduct and using a deterministic language to describe the process of becoming criminal.<sup>8</sup> The notion of 'classicism' thus tends to dissolve under close scrutiny, deriving any coherence it has not from the facts of intellectual history but from the careless habits of contemporary criminological teaching.

'Positivism' holds up little better as a descriptive term, although, unlike classicism, it at least has the merit of having been the self-description of a school of criminologists. The use of this word to describe the specific claims of Lombroso and his *scuola positiva* in the late nineteenth century (the born criminal, the constitutional and hereditary roots of criminal conduct, criminal types, etc.), and also to describe the huge and diverse range of criminological work which has been carried out within an empiricist framework (i.e., using 'theory-neutral' observation as a basis for inductive propositions, stressing measurement, objectivity, etc.), has been a source of great confusion in the discipline. Potted histories entrench this muddle whenever they talk indiscriminately about a 'positivist era' which stretched from the 1870s to the 1960s.

### THE OBJECT OF INQUIRY

One of the most problematic issues to be addressed by any intellectual history is the question of criteria for inclusion and exclusion. If one is writing the history of criminology, what is to count as relevant? Where does the subject start and where does it stop? Textbook histories generally avoid the issue and simply begin with Beccaria, the arbitrariness of this decision being concealed by the fact that this is by now the traditional place to start. But one can see the problem much more clearly on those occasions when criminology's intellectual history is the subject of a whole article or series of chapters. Thus, for instance, Israel Drapkin's essay in the *Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice* (Drapkin 1983)—like the more historically oriented textbooks by Bonger (1936) and Vold (1958)—seeks to provide a more serious, scholarly account of the subject's historical development. Drapkin traces criminology's intellectual history back through the early modern period, the Middle Ages, and the classical period to the ancient world and 'prehistoric times'. The problem here is that the selection criteria are unargued and hopelessly broad. Criminology's history becomes the history of everything that has ever been said, or thought, or done in relation to

<sup>7</sup> On the differences between Howard and Bentham, see Ignatieff 1978. On Beccaria as a Lockean empiricist, see Zeman 1981.

<sup>8</sup> See the discussion of writers such as Henry Dagge and Mannasseh Dawes in Green 1985.



law-breakers, and the links between this amorphous past and the particular present remain vague and unspecified. Worse still, the writings of ancient and medieval authors are ransacked in search of 'criminological' statements and arguments, as if they were addressing the same questions in the same ways as modern criminologists, and we are introduced to anachronistic creatures such as 'early modern criminology' and St Thomas Aquinas' analysis of 'criminogenic factors' (Drapkin 1983: 550).

This criminology-through-the-ages style of history is objectionable on a number of grounds. First of all, it distorts the meaning of earlier writers and conceals the fact that their statements are structured by assumptions and objectives—not to mention institutional contexts and cultural commitments—which are quite different from those of modern criminology.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, it gives the false impression that criminology is our modern response to a timeless and unchanging set of questions that previous thinkers have also pondered, though with notably less success. Criminology is seen as a science that was waiting to happen, the end point of a long process of inquiry that has only recently broken through to the status of true, scientific knowledge. This progressivist, presentist view of things fails to recognize that criminology is, in fact, a socially constructed and historically specific organization of knowledge and investigative procedures—a particular style of reasoning, representing, and intervening<sup>10</sup>—which is grounded in a particular set of institutions and forms of life. It is a 'discipline', a regime of truth with its own special rules for deciding between truth and falsity, rather than the epitome of right thought and correct knowledge. To adopt this fallacious way of thinking about the discipline's history is to cut off from view the other 'problematizations' (as Foucault would call them) that the historical record reveals, and to forget that our own ways of constituting and perceiving 'crime' and 'deviance' are established conventions rather than unchallengeable truths.<sup>11</sup> An important purpose of writing history is to help develop a consciousness of how conventions are made and remade over time, and thus promote a critical self-consciousness about our own questions and assumptions. The myth of an emergent criminological science, progressing from ancient error to modern truth, does little to improve our understanding of the past or of the present.

My remarks up to now have been directed against criminology's history as told by criminologists to criminologists. But in recent years our historical understanding of the subject has been considerably advanced by the work of 'outsiders' who owe no allegiance to the discipline and whose work is driven by quite different historical and critical concerns. The writings of Michel Foucault (1977), Robert Nye (1984), Daniel Pick (1989), Martin Wiener (1990), Marie-Christine Leps (1992), and others have, in their different ways, situated criminological discourse on a wider canvas, showing how this form of knowledge was grounded in quite specific institutional practices, political movements, and cultural settings. None of these authors provide an overall account of criminology's development, each one being concerned to understand the

<sup>9</sup> The classic discussion of this problem in the history of ideas is contained in Skinner 1969.

<sup>10</sup> For an elaboration of the conception of scientific practice suggested here, see Hacking 1983.

<sup>11</sup> For an account of how our ways of thinking and acting upon crime have recently been transformed, see Garland 2001.

criminological ideas prevailing in a particular period or setting, rather than to produce a genealogy of the discipline. But the analyses of these and other writers are of great importance for the understanding of criminology's past, and their work adds breadth and depth to the somewhat narrower, diachronic account which the present paper sets out. Similarly valuable is the recent work done in the newly developed field of the history of the human sciences by authors such as Nikolas Rose (1988), Roger Smith (1988), Kurt Danziger (1990), and Ian Hacking (1990). These writers have set out important methodological and theoretical guidelines for work in this area—guidelines that I have tried to follow in the present essay. They have also developed cogent historical analyses of disciplines such as psychology and statistics that are of great relevance for any account of criminology's development.<sup>12</sup>

## ORIENTATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT

I begin with the clear assumption that the phenomenon to be explained is a present-day phenomenon—the modern discipline of criminology—and that my task is to trace its historical conditions of emergence, identify the intellectual resources and traditions upon which it drew, and give some account of the process of its formation and development. This explicit concern to write a history of the present acknowledges that our contemporary problems and practices are quite distinct from those of the past; but equally, it recognizes that our present arrangements were constructed out of materials and situations that existed at earlier points in time. The present is continuous with the past in some respects, and discontinuous in others. It is the historian's job to identify the processes of transmutation which characterize change and, in particular, the generation of those differences which constitute our modernity.

Modern criminology, like any other academic specialism, consists of a body of accredited and systematically transmitted forms of knowledge, approved procedures and techniques of investigation, and a cluster of questions which make up the subject's recognized research agendas. These intellectual materials and activities are loosely organized by means of a 'discipline'—the standard form of academic organization. The discipline establishes and enforces appropriate norms of evidence and argument, evaluates and communicates research findings and other contributions to knowledge, fixes and revises the canon of theoretical and empirical knowledge, supervises the training of students, and distributes professional status and authority among accredited practitioners. These disciplinary functions are carried out, more or less effectively, by means of a variety of institutions—professional journals and associations, institutes and university departments, professional appointments, processes of peer review, letters of recommendation, training courses, textbooks, conferences, funding agencies, and so on—that make up the material infrastructure of the

<sup>12</sup> The history of anthropology also contains many suggestive parallels with that of criminology; see, e.g., Darnell 1974.



enterprise.<sup>13</sup> One has only to describe these taken-for-granted features explicitly to demonstrate that the modern discipline of criminology is indeed 'modern', and to pose the question of how such an institutional structure came to form itself around an intellectual specialism of this kind.

Modern criminology is a composite, eclectic, multidisciplinary enterprise. The subject is typically located in departments of law, sociology, or social policy, and training in criminology is normally at the postgraduate level, following on a first degree in a more basic field of study—though some British universities now offer undergraduate degrees in criminology and several have established centres for criminological research. In their research and teaching, criminologists draw upon a variety of other disciplines, most notably sociology, psychology, psychiatry, law, history, and anthropology—indeed, one of the major dynamics of modern criminology is the incessant raiding of other disciplines or ideologies for new ideas with which to pursue (and renew) the criminological project. Criminologists also address themselves to a wide range of research topics which somehow or other relate to crime and its control. Major areas of work include research on the incidence and distribution of criminal behaviour, inquiries about the causes or correlates of criminal conduct, clinical studies of individual delinquents and ethnographies of deviant groups, penological studies, victim studies, the monitoring and evaluation of criminal justice agencies, the prediction of future criminal conduct, crime prevention studies, research on criminal involvement, careers, and desistance, the study of processes of social reaction, and historical work on changing patterns of crime and control. The list of 'central' topics is long and diverse, and each topic breaks down further into numerous sub-topics and specialisms. When one considers that these substantive areas have been approached using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods, drawing upon the whole gamut of theoretical perspectives (psychoanalysis, functionalism, interactionism, ethnomethodology, Marxism, feminism, critical race theory, econometrics, systems theory, postmodernism, etc.) and ideological concerns (the implicit welfarism of most twentieth-century criminology, the radicalism of the 1970s, abolitionism, left realism, etc., etc.), it becomes apparent that modern criminology is highly differentiated in its theoretical, methodological, and empirical concerns.

The diverse character of the modern subject makes the question of its historical emergence and identity seem even more puzzling. How did this vast, eclectic bundle of disparate approaches, theories, and data come to acquire the status of a distinct academic specialism? At one level, the answer to this has already been set out above: the subject derives whatever coherence and unity it has from the exertions of its discipline-forming institutions. The danger of an exploding, unmanageable chaos of concerns is held in check by textbooks and teaching and a pattern of professional judgements that draw the subject together and establish its *de facto* boundaries. But this response necessitates a set of prior questions, such as: Why has there emerged a discipline of this kind? And what makes it possible and desirable to have a distinctive, specialist discipline of criminology in the first place? It seems to me that an answer to these questions can be formulated if one has regard to the basic problem-structures or

<sup>13</sup> On scientific disciplines and their development, see Lemaine *et al.* 1976.

projects of inquiry that underlie these disparate investigations. My argument will be that criminology is structured around two basic projects—the governmental and the Lombrosian—and that the formation and convergence of these projects can be traced by studying the texts and statements which constitute criminology's historical archive. Criminology, in its modern form and in its historical development, is oriented towards a scientific goal, but also towards an institutional field; towards a theoretical project, but also towards an administrative task. Whatever fragile unity the discipline achieves emerges from the belief that these two projects are mutually supportive rather than incompatible, that etiological research can be made useful for administrative purposes, and that the findings of operational research further the ends of theoretical inquiry. Occasionally, criminologists lose this faith, and when they do, their arguments cast doubt on the very viability of the discipline.<sup>14</sup>

As with most 'human sciences', criminology has a long past but a short history.<sup>15</sup> Discourses about crime and punishment have existed, in one form or another, since ancient times, but it is only during the last 120 years that there has been a distinctive 'science of criminology', and only in the last sixty or seventy years has there been in Britain an established, independent discipline organized around that intellectual endeavour. My account of the emergence of the modern British discipline will be divided into four parts:

1. a brief discussion of what I will call 'traditional' representations of crime and criminals;
2. an outline of the empirical analyses that were brought to bear upon crime and criminal justice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which began the tradition of inquiry which I call the governmental project;
3. an account of the emergence of a positive, specialist 'science of the criminal'—the Lombrosian project—in the late nineteenth century, both in continental Europe and in Britain;
4. an account of how these two projects converged in a way and to an extent which facilitated the formation of a criminological discipline in Britain in the middle years of the twentieth century.

This order of exposition implies a certain developmental pattern, and to some extent that seems appropriate. Criminological thought and practice have developed, at least in some respects, in a scientific direction, and the analysis presented here is concerned precisely to chart this evolution and to reconstruct the events and developments which played a role in that transmutation. The chronology of events is constructed in order to show how our particular ways of organizing thought and research have come into existence. But it needs to be emphasized that no overall process of progressive development is being asserted here, and there are no exclusive

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., the debates surrounding the development of a radical criminology that aimed to disengage from the policy goals of the state—a development which, for some writers, came to imply the dissolution of criminology as a discipline. See Bankowski *et al.* 1976, Hirst 1975. See also the reflections on the relationship between criminology and criminal justice policy by Petersilia 1991 and Bottoms 1987.

<sup>15</sup> For a theoretical discussion addressing this issue in the history of psychology, see Smith 1988.



boundaries neatly separating the thought of one period from the thought of another. Some residues of the 'traditional' ideas to be found in the seventeenth century still circulate today in the form of common sense and moral argument. Forms of thought and inquiry that flourished in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were rediscovered in the late twentieth century and adapted to serve contemporary purposes. Conversely, certain ideas and arguments that appeared progressive and persuasive to criminologists at the start of the twentieth century have since come to seem pseudo-scientific and faintly absurd.

Criminology's history is not one of steady progress and refinement, although whenever a framework of inquiry has endured for a long enough time, such refinements have taken place. Instead, it is a story of constant reformulation in response to shifting political pressures, changes in institutional and administrative arrangements, intellectual developments occurring in adjacent disciplines, and the changing ideological commitments of its practitioners. The very fact that a basic orientation of the discipline links it to a field of social problems and to administrative efforts to govern that field imparts a certain instability to the subject and constantly transforms its objects of study. As a discipline criminology is shaped only to a small extent by its own theoretical object and logic of inquiry. Its epistemological threshold is a low one, making it susceptible to pressures and interests generated elsewhere.

## TRADITIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIME

Social rules and the violation of them are intrinsic aspects of social organization, a part of the human condition. Discourse about crime and criminals—or about sin, villainy, roguery, deviance, whatever the local idiom—is thus as old as human civilization itself. Wherever generalized frameworks developed for the representation and explanation of human conduct—whether as myths, cosmologies, theologies, metaphysical systems, or vernacular common sense—they generally entailed propositions about aberrant conduct and how it should be understood.

As we have seen, some writers have taken this recurring concern with law-breakers as sufficient licence to talk about a 'criminology' which stretches back to the dawn of time. But rather than see such writings as proto-criminologies struggling to achieve a form which we have since perfected, it seems more appropriate to accept that there are a variety of ways in which crime can be problematized and put into discourse, and that 'criminology' is only one version among others. The propositions about crime and criminals that appear in the writings of ancient and medieval philosophers, the theologies of the Church of Rome and the Protestant Reform tradition, the mythicomagical cosmologies of the Middle Ages, and the legal thought of the early modern period, were not aspiring criminologies, even though their subject matter sometimes bears a resemblance to that which criminology seeks to explain. These broad resemblances begin to appear less compelling when one looks in detail at what were the conceptual elements of these discourses and their implicit assumptions about the world. Entities such as fate and demons, original sin and human depravity,

temptation, lust, and avarice are the products of mental frameworks and forms of life rather different from our own.<sup>16</sup>

The differences between these mentalities and our own can be quite instructive, pointing up some of the peculiarities of our accustomed ways of thinking about crime. It is significant, for example, that the major tradition of Western thought—Christianity, in all its variants—did not separate out the law-breaker as different or abnormal, but instead understood him or her as merely a manifestation of universal human depravity and the fallen, sinful state of all mankind.<sup>17</sup> “There but for the grace of God go I” is an understanding of things quite alien to much of the criminology that was written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the same way, the explicitly moral and spiritual terms in which the Christian tradition discusses individual wrongdoing, the lack of reference to systematically controlled empirical evidence, the invocation of the Devil, or divine intervention to account for human action, and the appeal to scriptural authority as proof for propositions, are all reminders of the rather different rules governing modern criminological discourse.

But traditional accounts of crime—Christian and otherwise—are not entirely remote from modern thinking about the subject. Scattered around in the diverse literature of the early modern period, in criminal biographies and broadsheets, accounts of the Renaissance underworld, Tudor rogue pamphlets, Elizabethan dramas and Jacobean city comedies, the utopia of Thomas More and the novels of Daniel Defoe,<sup>18</sup> one can discover rudimentary versions of the etiological accounts that are used today to narrate the process of becoming deviant. Stories of how the offender fell in with bad company, became lax in his habits and was sorely tried by temptation, was sickly, or tainted by bad blood, or neglected by unloving parents, became too fond of drink or too idle to work, lost her reputation and found it hard to get employment, was driven to despair by poverty, or simply driven to crime by avarice and lust—these seem to provide the well-worn templates from which our modern theories of crime are struck, even if we insist upon a more neutral language with which to tell the tale and think that a story’s plausibility should be borne out by evidence as well as by faith or intuition.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, Faller’s research (Faller 1987) suggests that what was lacking in these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accounts was not secular or materialist explanations of the roots of crime, which were present in abundance alongside the spiritual explanations proffered by the church. What was lacking was a developed sense of differential etiology. Crime was seen as an omnipresent temptation to which all humankind was vulnerable, but when it became a question of why some succumbed and others resisted, the explanation trailed off into the unknowable: resorting

<sup>16</sup> For a wide-ranging discussion, see Jean Delumeau’s account (Delumeau 1990) of sin and fear in thirteenth- to eighteenth-century Europe.

<sup>17</sup> For developments of this point, see Zeman 1981; and also Faller 1987.

<sup>18</sup> On criminal biographies and broadsheets, see Faller 1987; Sharpe 1985. On crime and criminals in Tudor rogue pamphlets and Jacobean city comedies, see Curtis and Hale 1981. For descriptions of the Elizabethan underworld, see Judges 1930; Salgado 1972.

<sup>19</sup> Matza (1969) analyses the recurring narratives of everyday discourse and shows how, in a slightly adapted form, these come to comprise the basic explanatory structures of contemporary criminological theory.



to fate, or providence, or the will of God. When, in the late nineteenth century, the science of criminology emerged, one of its central concerns would be to address this issue of differentiation and subject it to empirical inquiry.

'Traditional' ways of thinking about crime did not disappear with the coming of the modern, scientific age, though they may nowadays be accorded a different status in the hierarchy of credibility. These older conceptions—based upon experience and ideology rather than systematic empirical inquiry—have not been altogether displaced by scientific criminologies, and we continue to acknowledge the force of moral, religious, and 'common-sensical' ways of discussing crime. Expert, research-based knowledge about crime and criminals still competes with views of the subject which are not 'criminological' in their style of reasoning or their use of evidence. Judges, moralists, religious fundamentalists, and populist leader-writers still offer views on criminological subjects that are quite innocent of criminological science or research findings. Unlike physics, or even economics, which have established a degree of monopoly over the right to speak authoritatively about their subjects, criminology operates in a culture that combines traditional and scientific modes of thought and action. Intuitive, 'instinctive', common-sense views about crime and criminals are still more persuasive to many—including many in positions of power and authority—than are the results of carefully executed empirical research.

## THE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

In most criminological histories, the true beginnings of modern criminological thought are seen in writings of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Radzinowicz's monumental *History* (1948) begins in 1750, as does his historical essay on *Ideology and Crime* (1966). Mannheim's earliest 'pioneer' is Beccaria, whose *Of Crimes and Punishments* first appeared in 1764. Even *The New Criminology* (Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973), the radical and immensely influential textbook of the 1970s, begins its account with Beccaria and 'the classical school of criminology'. There are good grounds for choosing to emphasize the role of these eighteenth-century writings in the formation of criminology, but, as I suggested earlier, the connections are not as straightforward as is usually assumed. I have already argued that the writings of Beccaria, Bentham, and the others did not constitute a 'criminology'. But despite this, they did establish and develop some of the key elements and conditions necessary for the subsequent development of the subject in its modern form. They are quite properly a part of criminology's genealogy, having been a direct source for some of the subject's basic aims and characteristics, as well as having produced a stock of propositions and arguments which would feature prominently in the criminological discourse which developed in the twentieth century.

There are several genealogical strands that link certain eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers with the criminology that followed. Most importantly, Enlightenment writers such as Beccaria, Bentham, and Howard wrote secular,

materialist analyses, emphasizing the importance of reason and experience and denigrating theological forms of reasoning. They viewed themselves as proceeding in a scientific manner and dealing objectively with an issue that had previously been dominated by irrational, superstitious beliefs and prejudices. Members of the *scuola positiva* would later disparage the 'classical school' for its 'unscientific' reliance upon speculative reasoning rather than observed facts, but this is not how these writers viewed themselves. Indeed, it was the 'classicists' who first established the claim that crime and its control could be studied in a neutral, scientific manner.

Another important connection between the literature of the reformers and the criminology that followed was that the reformers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were writing about a set of legal institutions which were becoming (partly through those reformers' efforts) recognizably modern. The institutional concerns which animated the writings of Beccaria, Bentham, Howard, and the rest are, in an important sense, modern concerns—about the systematic arrangement of criminal laws and procedures in order to promote social policy goals; about the sentencing choices of magistrates; about the organization and conduct of professional police; about the design and purposes of prison regimes. The questions of interest to these writers—the psychology of offending, the nature of criminal motivation, the possibilities of deterrence and reform, and the most appropriate way for state institutions to regulate individual conduct—are also questions which were to become quite central to later criminology. These issues gripped the imagination of eighteenth-century thinkers because they lived in a world caught up in the dynamics of modernization. This was the period which saw the emergence of the centralized administrative state, a national economy and a population increasingly subject to governance, an autonomous, secular legal system, the political relations of liberalism, and institutional enclosures like the prison and the asylum with their reformatory, disciplinary regimes. The writings of Beccaria, Bentham, and Howard—like those of Benjamin Rush in America—were the first soundings of a modernist discourse about crime. As intellectual responses to the challenge of crime in a newly urbanized market society, they were addressing problems of a novel type, quite unfamiliar to traditional social thought. This new social and institutional environment, modified in certain ways, also formed the background against which the science of criminology would subsequently emerge, and in that respect there is a broad continuity of reference which makes eighteenth-century discourse 'modern' in a way that earlier writing is not. (Indeed, it is precisely because the reformist discourse of Beccaria *et al.* and the scientific discourse of Lombroso share a common institutional context that they are able to be viewed as 'opposites'. Each one entails a programme for directing the modern field of criminal justice.)

If one widens the lens to look beyond Beccaria and Bentham to some of the other discourses on crime and criminals dating from this period, one can detect other lines of affiliation. Patrick Colquhoun and Henry Fielding, as well as a large number of Parliamentary and private committees of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, used empirical evidence to situate and measure the extent of various crime problems ('the late increase in robbers', the relation between 'indigence' and crime, 'the alarming increase in juvenile delinquency', the 'police of the metropolis', and so



on).<sup>20</sup> As Leon Radzinowicz (1956) and Robert Reiner (1988) have pointed out, these inquiries formed part of a wider 'science of police' which flourished in this period, concerned not just with crime or criminals, but with the regulation and maintenance of the whole population in the interest of economy, welfare, and good governance (see also Foucault 1979; Pasquino 1991). John Howard's investigation of the state of the prisons was undertaken as a work of charity and reform, but his methods were doggedly empirical, and his study laid much stress on measurement and systematic observation as a basis for its findings.<sup>21</sup> Howard's work in the 1770s sparked the beginnings of a line of empirical penological inquiry that, from the 1830s onwards, became an increasingly important element in what was to become the British criminological tradition.

By the middle years of the nineteenth century this 'scientific' style of reasoning about crime had become a distinctive feature of the emergent culture of amateur social science. The papers delivered by Rawson W. Rawson, Joseph Fletcher, and John Glyde to the Statistical Society of London used judicial statistics and census data to chart the distribution and demography of crime, and to match up crime rates with other social indices—just as A.M. Guerry and Adolphe Quetelet had been doing in France and Belgium.<sup>22</sup> On the basis of carefully calculated correlations, they drew conclusions about the moral and social causes that influenced criminal conduct and presented their findings as instances of the new statistical science and its social uses. Henry Mayhew, writing in the middle years of the nineteenth century, was essentially a journalist concerned with 'the social question' and the problem of the poor. But unlike the moralists of a century earlier, his journalism was grounded in empirical research, using ethnographic and survey methods as well as life histories and statistical data; and his analyses of *London Labour and the London Poor* (1861–2) offered a series of empirically supported claims about the patterns and causes of professional crime in the city.<sup>23</sup>

Another line of inquiry which flourished in this period, and whose advocates would later be seen as progenitors of criminology, centred not upon the population and its governance by a well-ordered state, but instead upon individuals and their ability (or lack of ability) to govern themselves. As early as the 1760s and 1770s, Henry Dagge and Mannasseh Dawes argued that the law's notions of a free-willed offender were often enough fictions in the face of real social and psychological circumstances that limited choice and shaped human conduct, and they drew upon the new materialist psychologies of the time to explain how it was that causal processes could be acknowledged without entirely destroying the belief in man's free will (see Green 1985). Indeed, both Thomas Zeman (1981) and Piers Beirne (1993) have shown that

<sup>20</sup> See Colquhoun 1797, 1800, 1806, 1814; Fielding 1751; and the discussion of the Parliamentary and private committees of inquiry of this period in Radzinowicz 1956.

<sup>21</sup> See Howard 1773 [1777], 1773 [1789] and the discussion of his work in Ignatieff 1978.

<sup>22</sup> See the discussion of the work of Rawson, Fletcher, and Glyde in Morris 1957. Beirne (1993) provides detailed discussions of the work of Guerry and Quetelet and their place in the development of criminological thought.

<sup>23</sup> For a discussion of Mayhew's work and its relation to subsequent criminological analyses, see Morris 1957.

Cesare Beccaria's account of human conduct is shaped not by metaphysical assumptions about the freedom of the will, but instead by John Locke's empiricist psychology and the new 'science of man' developed by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment.

During the nineteenth century this reconceptualization of human character and conduct was taken up and developed in the field of medicine, especially psychological medicine. The art of 'physiognomy'—which, it was claimed, enabled its practitioners to judge character and disposition from the features of the face and the external forms of the body—had been known since the seventeenth century, but the essays of J.C. Lavater purported to give a scientific foundation to this useful skill (Lavater 1792).<sup>24</sup> The craniometry and phrenology of F.J. Gall and J.C. Spurzheim made similar claims in the early nineteenth century, this time focusing upon the shape and contours of the human skull as an external index of character.<sup>25</sup> By the 1830s physiognomy and phrenology had lost much of their scientific credibility and had become the obsession of a few enthusiastic publicists, but the quest to uncover the links between physical constitution and psychological character was continued in a different and more important line of research: the new science of psychiatry.

The emergence of a network of private asylums in the eighteenth century led to the development of a new quasi-medical specialism which was at first called alienism and subsequently came to be known as psychological medicine or psychiatry. The writings of asylum managers about their patients—about their conduct, the antecedents of their madness, and the forms of treatment to which they responded—formed the basis for a major tradition of scientific investigation, and one that would subsequently be an important source of criminological data and ideas.

Attempts to link psychological characteristics to physical constitutions formed an abiding concern of this new discipline, but equally significant for our purposes is its intense focus upon the insane individual—a focus permitted and encouraged by the long-term confinement of asylum patients under the daily gaze of the alienist (see Porter 1987). The new psychiatry produced an extensive scientific literature concerned with the description of different mental types, case histories and causal analyses of how their madness developed, and detailed accounts of how they responded to various forms of 'moral' and medical treatment. What was developing here was a new kind of empirical psychology, concentrating upon pathological cases and their rational management. And because many of these cases involved criminal conduct (whether of a minor or a serious kind), one of the offshoots of this enterprise was a developing diagnostic and prognostic literature claiming to give a scientific account of certain kinds of individual criminals. Particularly after the Lunacy Acts of the mid-nineteenth century, when the asylum network was expanded to house the country's poor as well as the well-to-do, the new psychiatric profession had more and more to say about conditions such as 'moral imbecility', 'degeneracy', and 'feeble-mindedness' that were deemed to be prevalent among the populations dealt with by the

<sup>24</sup> Richard Sennett (1977) provides an interesting account of various nineteenth-century efforts to judge character by outward appearance and describes the cultural predicament that prompted these concerns.

<sup>25</sup> On phrenology and its links to subsequent criminological studies, see Savitz *et al.* 1977. More generally, see Cooter 1981.



poor-houses and the prisons. Consequently, when a science of the criminal began to develop in the last decades of the century, there already existed a tradition of work the concerns of which ran in parallel with its own and from which it could draw a measure of support and encouragement. Indeed, for about fifty years after the publication of Lombroso's *L'Uomo Delinquente* (1876) the journals of the psychiatric profession were virtually the only ones in Britain that took a serious interest in Lombroso's project.

If one were reviewing all of the ideas and undertakings of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that bore a resemblance to elements which later appeared within the discipline of criminology, there would be other stories to tell. The various forms of charitable and social work with the poor, the societies for the care of discharged convicts, the management of workhouses, inquiries about the causes and extent of inebriety, investigations into the labour market, the employment and treatment of children, education, the housing of the poor, the settlement and boys' club movements, could all be identified as the roots of particular ingredients in the modern criminological mix. But one needs to recall that the ideas and forms of inquiry set out here did not add up to an early form of criminology for the simple reason that they did not 'add up' at all; nor could they until the later emergence of a form of inquiry centred upon the criminal which drew together these various enterprises under the umbrella of a specialist criminological discipline. In their own time, they were discrete forms of knowledge, undertaken for a variety of different purposes, and forming elements within a variety of different discourses, none of which corresponded exactly with the criminological project that was subsequently formed. Beccaria, for example, developed his arguments about the reform of the criminal law within the broader context of a work on political economy. Colquhoun's writings about crime and police were, for him, one aspect of a treatise on government in which he addressed the changing problems of governance thrown up by the emergence of urbanized market society and the baleful effects of trade and luxury upon the manners of the people. Physiognomists, phrenologists, and psychiatrists were attempting to understand the physical and mental roots of human conduct rather than to develop a particular knowledge of offenders and offending. Like the utilitarian psychology developed by Bentham, these were attempts to capture the springs of human action in general, not to single out the criminal for special and exclusive attention. None of these discourses was struggling to create a distinctive criminological enterprise, though once such a subject was created, each formed a resource to be drawn upon, usually in a way which wrenched its insights about crime apart from the framework which originally produced them.

Certainly, if one looks back from the perspective of the present, one can glimpse the outlines of the governmental project and the Lombrosian project gradually taking shape in this period. Empirical studies of the police, of prisons, of crime rates, and of the deterrent effects of criminal laws—the very stuff of criminology's governmental concerns—were already underway, conducted at first by amateurs but later by state officials utilizing the elementary tools of scientific method. However, these studies were not, at the time, viewed as distinct from other inquiries, into the market, morals, workhouses, or poverty. The underlying theme animating all of these studies was a

concern with governance and the use of empirical data and scientific methods to improve government's grip on the population. Only with the later professionalization and specialization of the various state agencies—and with the invention of 'criminology'—did the study of governance in criminal matters come to be viewed as distinct from the governance of the population in general. Similarly, one can see in the work of the nineteenth-century phrenologists and psychiatrists a concern to understand human conduct in scientific terms, to identify character types, and to trace the etiologies of pathological behaviours. But at this historical moment there was no focus upon the criminal as a special human type and no felt need for a specialism built around this entity. The splitting off of criminological studies—both in the administrative field and in the clinic—was a late nineteenth-century event that significantly changed the organization of subsequent thought and action.

Since the formation of criminology, criminologists have repeatedly identified what they take to be their 'roots'—the various lines of descent which link their present practice to work done a century and more before. But this is perhaps the wrong way to look at things. A more accurate account might suggest that at the end of the nineteenth century the idea of a specialist criminological science emerged—centred, as it happens, on the figure of the 'criminal type'—and that, after a process of struggle, adaptation, and convergence, this programmatic idea led to the establishment, in a rather different form, of an independent criminological discipline. Since the discipline was characterized by an eclectic, multidisciplinary concern to pursue the crime problem in all its aspects, the subject has continually expanded to embrace all of the ways in which crime and criminals might be scientifically studied; and in so doing, it has constantly created new predecessors for itself. The connection between eighteenth- and twentieth-century discourse about crime is not a matter of tenacious traditions of thought which have survived continuously for 200 years. Rather, it is a matter of a certain broad similarity between forms of inquiry and institutional arrangements which prevailed in the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, together with the tendency of the modern discipline to embrace everything that might be scientifically said about crime and criminals. Each time a new element is added to the criminological armoury—be it radical criminology, ecological surveys, sociological theory, or situational crime prevention—someone sooner or later discovers that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers were doing something similar, and that this new approach should therefore be considered a central feature of the criminological tradition, albeit one that was temporarily (and inexplicably) forgotten. But this recurring 'recovery of tradition' is perhaps better understood as a bid for intellectual respectability and disciplinary centrality than as a serious claim about the development of the subject. After all, the crucial requirement of a genealogy is continuity of descent, and it is precisely this continuity which is missing wherever 'traditions' have to be 'rediscovered'.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> For an historical account that seeks to explain the disappearance and subsequent reappearance of a set of criminological themes, see Garland 2000. This article analyses why ideas that would now be described as being about 'situational crime prevention' dropped out of criminological discourse for close to 200 years before reappearing in the 1970s.



If this account is accurate, and if criminology is a specific organization of knowledge which first emerged in the late nineteenth century, then the key problem is to try to describe its particularity and to explain the historical transmutation which produced this new form of enterprise. It has to be shown how the project of a specialized science emerged out of some other project or set of projects, and how it marked itself off from what went before. It is to that task that I now turn.

## THE EMERGENCE OF A POSITIVE SCIENCE OF THE CRIMINAL

### FROM CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY TO THE SCIENCE OF CRIMINOLOGY

The idea of a specialist science of the criminal was born out of the interaction of a specific intellectual endeavour and a certain social context. As is often the case, a transmutation was produced in the history of ideas when a particular set of ideas and inquiries was found to have relevance to a field that had previously been regarded as quite separate. Ironically enough, the scientific work which led Cesare Lombroso to found a specialist 'science of the criminal'—a key ingredient in the formation of the modern discipline of criminology—was not, in fact, criminological in any sense that we would recognize. Lombroso's criminal science grew, somewhat accidentally, out of an anthropological concern to study humanity and its natural varieties, using the methods of anthropometry and craniometry to measure the physical features of human subjects. Influenced by the physical anthropology of Paul Broca and a Darwinian concern with species and their evolution, Lombroso's study of Italian army recruits and asylum and prison inmates was an attempt to identify different racial types and to subject them to scientific scrutiny and categorization (see Gould 1981). By the 1870s, however, the science of 'racial anthropology', like the science of degeneracy developed by Morel, had begun to overlap with potent social concerns, as is shown by its identification of 'types' such as the genius, the epileptoid, and the insane which were patently derived from social policy interests rather than evolutionary processes. Thus Lombroso's 'pioneering' inquiries were actually extending a line of research that was already well established: his 'discovery' of the 'criminal type' merely restated, in a more vivid form, an observation that had already been made by psychiatrists such as Maudsley and prison doctors such as J. Bruce Thomson.

But if Lombroso's discovery was old news, the significance he gave to it was altogether novel. For him, the apparent distinctiveness of the criminal type prompted an idea that no one had imagined before: the idea of a distinctive science of the criminal. His conception of the criminal as a naturally occurring entity—a fact of nature rather than a social or legal product—led Lombroso to the thought of a natural science which would focus upon this entity, trace its characteristics, its stigmata, its abnormalities, and eventually identify the causes which make one person a criminal and another a normal citizen. And the startling thing about this Lombrosian



project for the scientific differentiation of the criminal individual was that, despite its dubious scientific credentials, it immediately met with a huge international response. In the twenty years following the appearance of *L'Uomo Delinquente* in 1876, this strange new science came to form the basis of a major international movement, manifesting itself in an outpouring of texts, the formation of new associations, international congresses, specialist journals, national schools of thought, and interested officials in virtually every European and American state. At the same time, Lombroso himself became something of a household name, featuring in the fiction of Tolstoy, Musil, Bram Stoker, and Conan Doyle, as well as in countless journalistic essays and scientific reports.<sup>27</sup>

In the years immediately following the publication of Lombroso's sensational claims a group of talented disciples gathered around him and a journal, *La Scuola Positiva*, was founded to publicize the new research and its practical implications. But disciples such as Enrico Ferri and Raffaele Garofalo were not content merely to repeat the master's formulations, and even the early work of this Italian school showed a considerable diversity and eclecticism, widening out the analysis to examine the social and legal aspects of criminality as well as its 'anthropological' embodiment. This process of differentiation within the research enterprise was amplified by the formation of rival schools of inquiry, notably the 'French school' which emphasized the sociological and environmental determinants of crime and played down the role of fixed constitutional attributes, and the 'German school' which included the study of criminalistics and the development of new forensic techniques and procedures.<sup>28</sup> A series of highly publicized international congresses, beginning in 1883, aired these disputes at length, with much acrimony on all sides, and resulted in the modification of most of Lombroso's original claims, particularly on the subject of the 'born criminal' and the fatalistic implications this notion was seen to have for the treatment and reform of offenders.

What eventually emerged from this process—especially in the writings of important second-generation figures like Prins, Saleilles, and Von Hamel—was a scientific movement which was much more eclectic and much more 'practical' than the original criminal anthropology had been (see Garland 1985a; Wetzell 2000). One indication of the process of revision and modification whereby Lombroso's original formulations were reworked into a more acceptable form was the adoption of the term 'criminology', which came into general use in the 1890s. The term was originally used not as an exact synonym for criminal anthropology, but as a neutral, generic term which avoided the partisanship implicit in the original term and others—such as 'criminal sociology', 'criminal biology', and 'criminal psychology'—which competed with it.

This new science of criminology, as it developed in the last decades of the

<sup>27</sup> On the spread of the criminological movement at the end of the nineteenth century, see Garland 1985a; Nye 1984. On Lombroso in contemporary fiction, see Pick 1989; Gould 1981; Leps 1992. On the development of criminal anthropology in the USA, see Rafter 1992 and 1997. On the reception of Lombroso's work in Britain, see Radzinowicz and Hood 1986, which also provides the most detailed account of the indigenous traditions of thinking about crime in the nineteenth century.

<sup>28</sup> On the development of German criminology, see Wetzell 2000. On the place of criminalistics in the history of criminology, see Valier 1998.

nineteenth century, was characterized by a number of distinctive features.<sup>29</sup> It was an avowedly scientific approach to crime, concerned to develop a 'positive', factual knowledge of offenders, based upon observation, measurement, and inductive reasoning, and rejecting the speculative thinking about human character which had previously informed criminal justice practices. In keeping with its Lombrosian origins, it focused its attentions upon the individual criminal, and in particular upon the characteristics which appeared to mark off criminals as in some way different from normal, law-abiding citizens. It assumed that scientific explanation amounted to causal explanation and therefore set itself the task of identifying the causes of crime, though it should be added that the notion of 'cause' was understood in a wide variety of ways, some of which were more 'determinist' than others, and the kinds of cause identified ranged from innate constitutional defects to more or less contingent social circumstances. Lastly, it addressed itself to the investigation of a new, pathological phenomenon—'criminality'—which it deemed to be the source of criminal behaviour and which, in effect, became the subject's *raison d'être* and the target of its practical proposals.

This concern to produce a differential diagnosis of the individual criminal and the etiology of his or her offending behaviour was in turn linked to a definite programme of practical action, quite at odds with the legal principles which had previously underpinned criminal justice practice. The notion of the offender's free will was attacked as a metaphysical abstraction, as was the concept of legal responsibility. Uniformity of sentencing was viewed as a failure to differentiate between different types of offender, and the principle of proportionate, retrospective punishment was rejected in favour of a flexible system of penal sanctions adapted to the reformability or dangerousness of the specific individual. Criminal justice was to cease being a punitive, reactive system and was to become instead a scientifically informed apparatus for the prevention, treatment, and elimination of criminality. It was to be a system run by criminological experts, concerned to maximize social defence, individual reform, and measures of security rather than to uphold some outdated and overly legalistic conception of justice.

That such a radical programme of research and reform could be developed and become influential is testimony to the extent to which the new criminology resonated with the concerns and preoccupations of the political and cultural milieux in which it emerged.<sup>30</sup> The popularity of Lombroso's work is probably explicable in terms of the extent to which his conception of the criminal type chimed with deep-rooted cultural prejudices and offered scientific respectability to middle-class perceptions of the 'criminal classes' forming in the growing cities (see Sennett 1977). But the viability of the criminological movement, and the fact that it so quickly became an international phenomenon, are indications that it was a programme of thought and action which successfully meshed with the social policies and institutional practices which were becoming established at the time. The increasing involvement of experts and scientists

<sup>29</sup> For an analysis of the science of criminology and its early development, see Garland 1985b.

<sup>30</sup> For a detailed account of the British cultural milieu in which the new criminological science took hold, see Wiener 1990.



in the administration of social problems in the late nineteenth century, and the related development of statistical data as a resource for governing, are relevant background conditions. So too is the developing concern on the part of governments, Poor Law administrators, police, and local authorities to classify and differentiate the populations they dealt with, seeking to identify and separate out dangerous elements while shoring up the social attachments of the 'deserving poor' and the 'respectable' working classes. In this specific context, the criminological programme offered certain regulatory and legitimacy possibilities that made it attractive to late nineteenth-century governments and administrators.

The regulatory advantages of the new criminology lay in its rejection of the formal egalitarianism that had previously shaped the practices of criminal law and its enforcement. As against the principle that everyone should be treated equally, criminology offered to differentiate between constitutional and accidental criminality, thus identifying the real sources of social danger and marking out the contours of the criminal class in a scientific rather than a moralistic way. Criminology also promised to provide a more extensive and a more effective form of intervention and regulation. Concerned to diagnose an individual's level of dangerousness rather than to judge whether or not he or she had yet broken the law, criminology offered the prospect of a system of control in which official measures need not wait for an offence to occur, or be limited by any principle of proportionality. At the same time, this more interventionist system could also claim to be more humane, in so far as its rationale was the promotion of individual and social welfare and not merely the infliction of retributive punishment (see Garland 1985a; Wiener 1990).

Finally, as is by now well documented, the new criminology met with extensive interest and social support because it was closely linked to the new prisons which had, by the late nineteenth century, become a prominent feature of all Western societies. As Michel Foucault (1977) has shown, the disciplinary, reformatory practices of the penitentiary prison acted as a practical 'surface of emergence' for the individualizing, differentiating discourse of criminology. What Lombroso invented was a science of individual differences; but the data and social arrangements necessary for the production of this science, as well as the practical context in which such a knowledge would be practically useful, were already inscribed in the architecture and regimes of the disciplinary prison. In the prison setting inmates were arranged in individual cells, and subjected to constant, individual surveillance for long periods of time, their behaviour and characteristics being continually monitored in order that disciplinary measures could be adjusted to deal with individual reactions and peculiarities. The systematic and differentiating knowledge of offenders to which this gave rise formed the basis for the new science of criminology, which slowly fed back into the practices of imprisonment, refining the prison's classifications and techniques, and enhancing the authorities' understanding of the individuals who were held in custody (see Garland 1985a). The widespread use of disciplinary imprisonment in late nineteenth-century Europe and America thus provided a ready-made setting through which criminology could emerge and establish itself as a useful form of knowledge. As Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise (1924) put it, '*la science pénitentiaire* develops gradually into the

science of the discovery of the causes of crime—the science of criminology'.<sup>31</sup> Lombroso's project was thus propelled not just by its own scientific logic but by a combination of institutional and cultural dynamics, a set of forces which were to sustain this form of inquiry long after Lombroso's own reputation was utterly destroyed.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY IN BRITAIN

As was often pointed out at the time, British intellectuals and criminal justice officials played very little part in the early development of this European criminological movement. Most of the relevant research and publication took place in Italy, France, and Germany, and the British were notable absentees at the international congresses held to debate the claims and counter-claims of the various schools. It was not until the Geneva Congress of Criminal Anthropology in 1896 that Britain first sent an official delegate—the prison inspector Major Arthur Griffiths—and Griffiths returned with a critical report (see Griffiths 1904) that reinforced the scepticism with which British officials viewed the claims of the new criminologists. Griffiths was later to write the first entry to appear on 'Criminology' in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1910–11) in which he attacked the theory of criminal types, but went on to show a cautious interest in the penological ideas which were by then emerging from the movement.

The arm's-length attitude of the British penal establishment to the new criminology was something of a surprise to individual enthusiasts such as Havelock Ellis and William Douglas Morrison, both of whom did much to introduce continental ideas into this country. Ellis published a book entitled *The Criminal* in 1890 which was, in effect, a summary of the major ideas of criminal anthropology, and he regularly reviewed foreign criminological publications for the *Journal of Mental Science* from 1890 to 1919. Morrison established and edited 'The Criminology Series', which published translations of works by Lombroso (1895), Ferri (1895) and Proal (1898), as well as publishing a number of his own works, including *Juvenile Offenders* (1896). One cause of this surprise was that many of the new criminologists, including Lombroso himself, pointed to earlier work published in Britain which appeared to contain the kinds of ideas which would later become central to the criminological movement. Thus, in the 1860s the psychiatrist Henry Maudsley and the prison medical officer J. Bruce Thomson had written about 'the genuine criminal' and 'the criminal class', describing these individuals as 'morally insane', 'degenerate', 'defective in physical organisation . . . from hereditary causes' and 'incurable' in a way that appeared to be altogether 'Lombrosian' before Lombroso.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> On the prison as a 'surface of emergence' for criminological knowledge, see Foucault 1977; also Garland 1992.

<sup>32</sup> Maudsley (1863: 73) refers to 'the criminal' as a 'fact in nature' and to criminals as 'if not strictly a degenerate species, certainly . . . a degenerate variety of the species'. Thomson (1867: 341) states that 'all who have seen much of criminals agree that they have a singular family likeness or caste . . . Their physique is coarse and repulsive; their complexion dingy, almost atrabilious; their face, figure and mien, disagreeable. The women are painfully ugly; and the men look stolid, and many of them brutal, indicating physical and moral deterioration. In fact there is a stamp on them in form and expression which seems to me the heritage of the class.' For a discussion of these debates, see Garland 1988; also Radzinowicz and Hood 1986.



But to describe Maudsley and Thomson as criminologists before the fact was misleading. Maudsley was engaged in a distinctively psychiatric endeavour (the development and application of typologies dealing with various mental disorders and pathologies) and Thomson's concern was to assess the impact of prison discipline upon the bodies and minds of prisoners (see Thomson 1867). Neither of them for a moment imagined that there was any justification for a distinctive scientific specialism centered upon the criminal. More importantly, during the 1870s and 1880s British medical and psychiatric opinion had shifted away from earlier attempts to characterize 'criminals' in such indiscriminate, pathological terms. From the 1870s onwards, prison doctors such as David Nicolson and John Baker set about redefining 'the morbid psychology of criminals', so as to differentiate a range of conditions rather than a single type. Nicolson (1878-9) emphasized that professional observation made it plain that only a minority of criminals were in any sense mentally abnormal, and he forcibly rejected any suggestion that offenders were generally 'incurable' or beyond the reach of prison reformation. During the same years, the nascent British psychiatric profession was learning that criminal courts would not tolerate psychiatric evidence that contradicted basic legal axioms about individual free will and responsibility, and psychiatrists gradually developed a *modus vivendi* that aimed to minimize conflict between psychiatry and law. By the 1880s, leading figures of the new profession such as Needham, Hack Tuke, Nicolson, and Maudsley were taking pains to distance themselves from the embarrassing claims made by psychiatrists (Maudsley among them) in earlier years—claims that were now being taken up again by criminologists with their talk of 'born criminals', 'the criminal type', atavism, and so on (see Nicolson 1878-9; Maudsley 1889; Tuke 1889; Needham 1889; Baker 1892; Nicolson 1895; Garland 1988).

The relationship between the new continental movement and the studies of criminals carried out in Britain by prison doctors and psychiatrists is a complex one, and the assumption (made by Ellis and others) that the two were continuous is a simplification which glosses over important differences. Unlike Lombroso's anthropology, British psychiatry was not concerned to isolate discrete human 'types' and classify them by means of racial and constitutional differences. Instead, it was a therapeutically oriented practice based upon a system of classifying mental disorders which, like the disease model of nineteenth-century medicine, discussed the condition separately from the individual in whom it might be manifested. Within the classification schemes of morbid psychology there was a variety of conditions which criminals were said to exhibit, including insanity, moral insanity, degeneracy, and feeble-mindedness. But generally speaking, the criminal was not conceived of as a distinct psychological type.

More important than this theoretical difference was the way in which British psychiatry contrasted with Lombrosian anthropology in its practical commitments and its relationship to the institutions of criminal justice. In his early publications, Lombroso claimed that his ideas had great relevance for criminal law and penal policy, but, as his critics soon pointed out, he was not particularly well informed about the practical realities of crime and punishment.<sup>33</sup> In consequence, his penology was not just radical

<sup>33</sup> See, for instance, the review by Arthur St John (1912) of Lombroso's work, in which he contrasts Lombroso's naivety with the experienced practical understanding of a prison doctor such as James Devon.

and at odds with current practices; it was also naive and distorted, lacking a close familiarity with the normal range of offenders and the institutions that dealt with them. Lombroso's conception of the criminal type had emerged from the theoretical hypotheses of physical anthropology rather than from extensive penological experience, and only gradually did he modify his views to bring them more into line with the way legal institutions worked. In contrast, the scientific thinking about the criminal which developed in British psychiatric and medico-legal circles was closely tied into professional tasks such as the giving of evidence before courts of law, or the decisions as to classification, diagnosis, and regimen that prison medical officers made on a daily basis. This practical experience was crucial in shaping the psychiatric approach to 'criminological' issues, because it ensured that psychiatrists and prison doctors were well acquainted with the day-to-day realities of criminal justice and with the need to bring psychiatric propositions into line with the demands of courts and prison authorities.

The British tradition that was closest to the criminology developing on the continent—penal and forensic psychiatry—was thus also somewhat hostile to it. The scientific studies conducted by British prison doctors and psychiatrists were, from an early stage, situated within an institutional framework that shaped their purposes and constrained their findings. In consequence, these studies were generally modest in their claims and respectful of the requirements of institutional regimes and legal principles. As far as most prison doctors and experienced psychiatrists were concerned, the majority of criminals were more or less normal individuals; only a minority required psychiatric treatment, and this usually involved removing them from the penal system and putting them into institutions for the mentally ill or defective. And although the diagnostic and therapeutic claims of psychiatry changed over time, from an early stage it was recognized that, for the majority of offenders, the normal processes of law and punishment should apply. Compared to the sweeping claims of criminal anthropology, the British medico-legal tradition was, by the 1890s, somewhat conservative, and generally dismissive of Lombrosian ideas. Senior psychiatric figures such as Maudsley and Conolly Norman referred publicly to the 'puerilities of criminal anthropology' and the 'lamentable extravagances' of the new theories (Norman 1895; Maudsley 1895). Sir Horatio Bryan Donkin, the first Medical Commissioner of Prisons, gave clear expression to the difference between the two traditions when he defined 'criminology', properly so-called, as the investigations undertaken by 'persons concerned in some way with the prison authorities who strive to discover just principles on which to base their work', and distinguished this from the newer 'doctrine and debate on the causation of crime' which he condemned as 'theories based on preconceived assumptions regardless of fact' (Donkin 1917).

So scientific research on individual criminals in Britain stemmed from a rather different root than did continental criminology, and inclined towards a more pragmatic, institutionalized approach to its subject. But, as I noted earlier, the international criminological movement tended to become more eclectic, more moderate, and more practical over time, gradually dissociating itself from extremist claims and adapting to the basic demands of the institutions it sought to influence. And as it became more respectable and more firmly established, the initial hostility of Britain's



scientific and penological circles tended to fade. From the mid-1890s onwards, the English and Scottish Prison Commissions began to take an active interest in the movement, as did the leading psychiatric periodicals. Even the influential Gladstone Committee Report gave passing approval to the 'learned but conflicting theories' which subjected 'crime, its causes, and treatment' to 'scientific inquiry' (Gladstone Committee 1895: 8). What seems gradually to have happened in Britain in the years before the First World War is that 'criminology' ceased to be exclusively identified with its European anthropological origins and instead became used as a general term to describe scientific research on the subject of crime and criminals. Grudgingly at first, but more and more frequently, prison officials, psychiatrists, and doctors began to refer to their researches as 'criminological', until this became the accepted name for a new scientific specialism. The irony is that, in Britain at least, criminology came to be recognized as an accredited scientific specialism only when it began to rid itself of the notion of the distinctive 'criminal type'—the very entity that had originally grounded the claim that a special science of the criminal was justified.

Most of the early British work which identified itself as criminological was actually a continuation of the older medico-legal tradition of prison research, now opened out to engage with an expanding criminological literature imported from Europe and North America. It is, for example, almost exclusively within the Reports of the Medical Commissioner of Prisons and of the various prison medical officers that one will find any official discussion of criminological science in the first few decades of the twentieth century, and most of the major scientific works on crime written in Britain before the 1930s were written by doctors with psychiatric training and positions within the prison service.<sup>34</sup> The first university lectures in 'criminology' delivered in Britain—given at Birmingham by Maurice Hamblin Smith in 1921—were directed at postgraduate medical students within a course entitled 'Medical Aspects of Crime and Punishment'. And long before Hermann Mannheim began teaching at the London School of Economics in 1935, there were courses on 'Crime and Insanity' offered at London University by senior prison medical officers such as Sullivan and East.<sup>35</sup> In the absence of any specialist periodicals devoted to criminology, criminological articles and reviews appeared chiefly in the *Journal of Mental Science*, *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, and the *Transactions of the Medico-Legal Association* (from 1933 *The Medico-Legal and Criminological Review*), although the *Howard Journal* also carried some reviews, as did the *Sociological Review*.

The institutionally based, medico-legal criminology which predominated in Britain for much of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was, by its nature, an evolving, adaptive tradition. The criminological texts that it generated grew out of practical contexts that were forever changing, since institutions continually redefined their operations and took on new concerns, and also because new methods, theories, and techniques became available to the professionals who

<sup>34</sup> See, amongst others, Sutherland 1908; Quinton 1910; Devon 1912; Smith 1922; Sullivan 1924; East 1927.

<sup>35</sup> According to his own account, Cyril Burt had regularly given lectures on juvenile delinquency at Liverpool University between 1906 and 1914; but these had occurred in the context of a psychology class rather than one devoted to 'criminology'. See Mannheim 1957.

administered them. Many of the criminological texts written in the nineteenth century focused upon the problems of classifying particular offenders—as psychiatric rather than criminal cases, as morally insane, feeble-minded, and so on—and of course these problems had a direct bearing upon the practices of penal institutions. As the penal system diversified in the early part of the twentieth century, developing specialist institutions for the inebriate, habitual offenders, the feeble-minded, and for juveniles, and becoming more refined and differentiated in the classification of adult prisoners, the criminological literature similarly began to address itself to these new diagnostic and classificatory problems.<sup>36</sup> Thus, although this line of research came close to the concerns of the Lombrosian project in its focus upon individuals and their differential classification, it lacked the scientific ambition and theory-building concerns of the latter, being almost exclusively focused upon knowledge that was useful for administrative purposes.

In 1919, the emphasis upon individual character and specialized treatment prompted by the Gladstone Committee Report—together with concerns about large numbers of shell-shocked and mentally disturbed men returning from the war—led the Birmingham Justices to establish a permanent scheme for the clinical examination of untried adult offenders. Previously such work had been done on an occasional, ad hoc basis, and depended upon the skill and interest of the local prison doctor. By appointing Hamblin Smith and W.A. Potts, both psychiatrically trained prison doctors, and charging them with these new duties, the Justices effectively created a new specialism of applied criminology. Before long, Potts and Hamblin Smith were adapting the standard mental tests for use in this area, publishing the results of their clinical studies, and writing extensively about the need for this kind of investigation and its implications for the treatment and prevention of crime. In *The Psychology of the Criminal* (1922b) and in a series of articles in the *Journal of Mental Science*, the *Howard Journal*, and elsewhere, Smith emphasized the importance of criminological study, though for him this meant the clinical examination of individual offenders for the purpose of assessment and diagnosis. As Britain's first authorized teacher of 'criminology', and as the first individual to use the title of 'criminologist', it is significant that Smith, like Donkin and Ruggles-Brise before him, rejected the search for 'general theories' in favour of the 'study of the individual'. It is also significant that the centres for criminological research and teaching which he proposed were envisaged as places where 'young medical graduates' would be trained to become expert in the medico-psychological examination and assessment of offenders (Smith 1922a).

Hamblin Smith was also one of the first criminological workers in Britain to profess an interest in psychoanalysis, which he used as a means to assess the personality of offenders, as well as a technique for treating the mental conflicts which, he claimed, lay behind the criminal act. In this respect Smith met with much official opposition, particularly from W. Norwood East; but there were others, outside the prisons establishment, who were more enthusiastic. In the winter of 1922–23, Dr Grace Pailthorpe

<sup>36</sup> Works on alcoholism by W.C. Sullivan (1906), on recidivism by J.E. Sutherland (1908), and on the psychology of the criminal by M. Hamblin Smith (1922) and H.E. Field (1932) are significant examples of research derived from the developing penal-welfare complex.



assisted Smith in the psychoanalytic investigation of female offenders in Birmingham, and went on to complete a five-year study at Holloway, funded by a grant from the Medical Research Council. Her report (Pailthorpe 1932), which was completed by 1929 but held back by the Council until 1932, claimed that crime was generally a symptom of mental conflict that might be psychoanalytically resolved. This radical approach met with some consternation in official circles (see East 1936: 319), but it excited the interest of a number of analysts and medical psychologists who formed a group to promote the Pailthorpe report and its approach. Out of their meetings emerged the Association for the Scientific Treatment of Criminals (1931), which, in 1932, became the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency (ISTD) (see Glover 1960).

Most of the founder members of this group were involved in the new outpatient sector of psychiatric work, made possible by a developing network of private clinics, which included the Tavistock (1921) and the Maudsley (1923), the new child guidance centres, and, in 1933, the ISTD's own Psychopathic Clinic (which in 1937 was moved and renamed the Portman Clinic). This new field of practice gave rise to its own distinctive brand of criminological theory. The early publications of the ISTD emphasize the clinical exploration of individual personality, and in that sense are continuous with much previous work. But they also manifest a new preventive emphasis, which reflected the fact that the new clinics operated outside the formal penal system and could deal with individuals before their disturbed conduct actually became criminal.<sup>37</sup> Eventually, the ISTD's emphasis upon psychoanalysis, and its open hostility to much official penal policy, ensured that it remained essentially an outsider body, operating at arm's length from the Home Office and the Prison Commission. This outsider status forms an important background to the later decision of the Home Office to support the establishment of a criminological institute at Cambridge, rather than under ISTD auspices in London, for although 'the formation of such a body was one of the original aims of the ISTD' (Glover 1960: 70), and the claims of the organization were canvassed to the Home Secretary in 1958, the Home Office appears not to have seriously considered such an option (see Radzinowicz 1988: 9).

Despite its subsequent neglect, the medico-legal work of W. Norwood East—particularly *An Introduction to Forensic Psychiatry in the Criminal Courts* (1927) and *The Medical Aspects of Crime* (1936)—better represents the mainstream of British criminology in the 1920s and 1930s. East was a psychiatrically trained prison medical officer who became a leading figure in the 1930s as Medical Director on the Prison Commission and President of the Medico-Legal Society, and his views dominated official policy-making for a lengthy period. East was himself a proponent of a psychological approach to crime, but he considered its scope to be sharply delimited, and

<sup>37</sup> As the editors of the *British Journal of Delinquency* put it in the first issue: 'the activities of the "institutional" criminologist have been rather overshadowed in recent years by the expansion of what might be called the "ambulant" approach to delinquency, i.e. the application of diagnostic and, where necessary or possible, therapeutic methods to early cases attending Delinquency Clinics, Child Guidance and Psychiatric Centres, etc. . . . And to the extent that the Delinquency Clinic bridges the gap between the "non-delinquent" and the "recidivist", it is inevitable that the ambulant system should provide the most fruitful field for research into causes and methods of prevention' ('Editorial', *British Journal of Delinquency*, 1/1 (1950/1): 4).

consistently warned against the dangers and absurdities of exaggerating its claims. Instead of theoretical speculation and scientific ambition he stressed the importance of 'day-to-day administration', and the practical impact of theoretical ideas. (Hence his criticism of deterministic ideas, which he thought promoted 'mental invalidism' instead of trying to build up a sense of 'social responsibility' (East 1931: 2).) In 1934 he established an extended experiment at Wormwood Scrubs prison, whereby those offenders deemed most likely to respond to psychological therapy—particularly sex offenders and arsonists—were subjected to a period of investigation and treatment. At the end of five years, East and Hubert's Report on *The Psychological Treatment of Crime* (1939) reaffirmed East's view that while 80 per cent of offenders were psychologically normal, and would respond to routine punishment, a minority might usefully be investigated and offered psychological treatment. The Report proposed a special institution to deal with such offenders—a proposal that was immediately accepted but not put into effect until the opening of Grendon Underwood prison in 1962. East and Hubert also recommended that this institution should function as a centre for criminological research, and it is significant that when a criminological centre was here proposed for the first time in an official report, it should be envisaged as part of a psychiatric institution, dealing only with a small minority of pathological offenders.

An important departure from this British tradition of clinically based psychiatric studies was *The English Convict: A Statistical Study*, published in 1913 by Dr Charles Goring under the auspices of the Home Office and the Prison Commission. This work was made possible by institutional routines, in so far as anthropometric methods were used in prisons for the identification of habitual offenders during the 1890s, and in fact one of its starting points was a desire to measure the impact of prison diet and labour upon the inmates' physiques. But the issues addressed by the final report went far beyond these institutional matters and engaged, for the first time in an official publication, with the theoretical claims of scientific criminology.

The analysis and tabulation of the vast quantity of data collected by the study were carried out in Karl Pearson's Biometrical Laboratory at the University of London—an unusual location for prison research but one which was well suited to the statistical and eugenic themes which dominated the final report. As its sponsors intended, the study gave a definitive refutation of the old Lombrosian claim that criminals exhibited a particular physical type, thus confirming the position which the British authorities had held all along. However, the significance of Goring's study went far beyond this negative and somewhat out-of-date finding. In fact, Goring's analysis began by *assuming* that there was no criminal type, and although it was not much noticed at the time, his study is chiefly notable for inventing a quite new way of differentiating criminals from non-criminals.

In the early part of the book, Goring set out extensive theoretical and methodological arguments which insisted that criminality should be viewed not as a qualitative difference of type, marked by anomaly and morbidity, but instead as a variant of normality, differentiated only by degree. Following the arguments of Manouvrier and Topinard, Goring pointed out that so-called criminal 'anomalies' are only 'more or less extreme degrees of character which in some degree are present in all men'.



Moreover, he made it clear that his use of statistical method necessarily presupposed this idea of a criminal characteristic which is a common feature of all individuals, and he went on to name this hypothesized entity 'the criminal diathesis'. This conception of criminality as normal, rather than morbid or pathological, implied a new basis for criminological science, which Goring vigorously set forth. From now on, criminology would no longer depend on the clinical gaze of a Lombroso and its impressionistic identification of anomalies. (Goring had, in any case, provided a devastating critique of this 'anatomico-pathological method'.) Instead it must be a matter of large populations, careful measurement, and statistical analysis, demonstrating patterns of differentiation in the mass that would not be visible in any specific individual nor apparent to the naked eye unaided by statistical analysis.

Goring's own application of these methods purported to reveal a significant, but by no means universal, association between criminality and two heritable characteristics, namely low intelligence and poor physique, and suggested that 'family and other environmental conditions' were not closely associated with crime. From these findings he drew a series of practical, eugenic conclusions, declaring that 'crime will continue to exist as long as we allow criminals to propagate' and that government should therefore 'modify opportunity for crime by segregating the unfit' and 'regulate the reproduction of those constitutional qualities—feeble-mindedness, inebriety, epilepsy, deficient social instinct, insanity, which conduce to the committing of crime' (Goring 1913). Here, as so often in subsequent studies, we see Lombroso's specific claims rejected, only to find that his basic assumptions and project are being reasserted in some new, revised form.

Although *The English Convict* had a considerable impact abroad, and especially in the USA, in Britain it received a much more muted response. On the one hand, Goring's attack had been centred upon theoretical positions that had little support in this country, other than from maverick outsiders such as Havelock Ellis. On the other, it appeared to have policy implications—particularly the possibility that inherited traits would render reformatory prison regimes impotent—which were not altogether welcome in official circles. The Prison Commissioners, while supporting the study's publication as a Blue Book, refused to endorse its conclusions (see Garland 1985a), and Sir Bryan Donkin (1919) distanced himself from the book altogether, arguing that 'even correct generalisations . . . concerning criminals in the mass are not likely to be of much positive value in the study or treatment of individuals'. In much the same way W.C. Sullivan, the medical superintendent at Broadmoor, argued in *Crime and Insanity* (1924) that clinical rather than statistical methods were the only reliable means of obtaining useful, policy-relevant knowledge.

These exchanges are revealing because they show the extent to which British criminology up to this point was shaped by the interests and assumptions of official policy-makers and the institutions that they served. In the years before the First World War, the medico-legal assessment of individual offenders played an explicit role in the trial process and in the disposition of offenders after conviction, so the promised benefits of clinical research were readily apparent in a way that was not true of statistical studies. Later on, when criminal justice officials came to realize how they could use the results of actuarial calculations—in predicting response to treatment,

deploying police resources, calculating crime rates, making parole decisions, and so on—the balance of interest shifted the other way. Though he did not live to see it (having died in 1919), Goring's argument for the importance of statistical method and mass data in criminological research was the one which was ultimately most persuasive to the British authorities. By the end of the 1930s, the Prison Commission and the Home Office had each embarked upon large-scale, statistically based projects, subsequently published as East (1942) and Carr-Saunders *et al.* (1942), and such studies became a characteristic form of government-sponsored research in the years after 1945.

If East's work exemplified the mainstream British tradition of medico-psychiatric criminological research (with the ISTD's more radical clinical studies forming an important tributary), and Goring inaugurated a new stream of statistical studies, there was also another significant line of inquiry which influenced criminological work in the post-war period. This third stream is best represented by the eclectic, multifactorial, social-psychological research of Cyril Burt. When later criminologists such as Mannheim and Radzinowicz looked back upon their predecessors, they spent little time discussing the merits of *The English Convict* or *The Medical Aspects of Crime*. Instead, they invariably picked out Cyril Burt's 1925 study, *The Young Delinquent*, as the first major work of modern British criminology and as an exemplar for the discipline that they were helping to create.<sup>38</sup> Like most criminological texts in this period, *The Young Delinquent* emerged from a specific field of practice—it was not until the 1960s that research took off from an academic base—but in marked contrast to the work of East, Hamblin Smith, Sullivan, and company, this field of practice was outside the penal system rather than central to it. In his post as educational psychologist to the London County Council, Burt was responsible for the psychological assessment and advice of London's schoolchild population, which involved him in examining thousands of individual problem cases, many of them behavioural as well as educational, and making recommendations for their treatment. Consequently, his criminological study was built upon a wider than usual population, dealing mostly with 'pre-delinquents' rather than convicted offenders, and it was not constrained by the narrowly penal concerns that affected most contemporary studies. Rather than inquire about specific classifications or distinctions, Burt was interested to specify all the possible sources of individual psychological difference, and thereby to identify the causal patterns that precipitate delinquency and non-delinquency.

*The Young Delinquent* was based upon the detailed clinical examination of 400 schoolchildren (a delinquent or quasi-delinquent group and a control group), using a battery of techniques that included biometric measurement, mental testing, temperament testing, and psychoanalytic and social inquiries, together with the most up-to-date statistical methods of factor analysis and correlation. Its findings were expansively eclectic, identifying some 170 causative factors that were in some way associated with delinquency, and showing, by way of narrative case histories, how each factor might typically operate. From his analysis, Burt concluded that certain

<sup>38</sup> See Mannheim (1949: 11); also Radzinowicz (1961: 173–6): 'it may be said that modern criminological research in England dates only from Sir Cyril Burt's study of *The Young Delinquent*, first published in 1925.'



factors, such as defective discipline, defective family relationships, and particular types of temperament, were highly correlated with delinquency, while the influence of other factors, such as poverty or low intelligence, though not altogether negligible, had been seriously overstated in the past. His major proposition was that delinquency was not the outcome of special factors operating only on delinquents, but was rather the result of a combination of factors—typically as many as nine or ten—operating at once upon a single individual. In consequence, the study of criminality must be, above all, multicausal in scope, while its treatment must be tailored to fit the needs of the individual case. The influence of Burt's work, and especially its eclectic, multifactorial search for the correlates of individual delinquency, was to become something of a hallmark of British criminology in the mid-twentieth century, though ironically enough (in view of Burt's modern reputation as a proponent of genetically-based intelligence) his most immediate impact was to shift attention away from the purported intellectual deficiencies of delinquents towards questions of temperament and emotional balance.

The scientific criminology that developed in Britain between the 1890s and the Second World War was thus heavily dominated by a medico-psychological approach, focused upon the individual offender and tied into a correctionalist penal-welfare policy. Within this approach there were a number of important variants and the enterprise was differently understood by different practitioners; but compared to the subject which exists today, criminology operated within rather narrow parameters. Sociological work, such as that developed by Durkheim in France at the turn of the century, or in Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s (which treated crime rates as social facts to be explained by sociological methods), was virtually absent. Instead the 'social dimension' of crime was conceived of as one factor among many others operating upon the individual—a good example of how the criminological project transforms the elements which it 'borrows' from other disciplines. Nor was the radicalism of foreign criminologists such as Enrico Ferri and Willem Bonger much in evidence here; indeed, if British criminology can be said to have developed radical analyses during this period, they were inspired by Sigmund Freud rather than by Karl Marx.<sup>39</sup>

The major topics of scientific interest were those thrown up as problems for the courts, the prisons, and the Borstal system—such as the mentally abnormal offender, recidivists, and especially juvenile delinquents—and the central purpose of scientific research was not the construction of explanatory theory but instead the more immediate end of aiding the policy-making process. The governmental project dominated, almost to the point of monopolization, and Lombroso's science of the criminal was taken up only in so far as it could be shown to be directly relevant to the governance of crime and criminals. Such a pragmatic, correctionalist orientation was, of course, hardly surprising when one recalls that the authors of pre-war criminological research in Britain were, virtually without exception, practitioners working in the state penal system or else in the network of clinics and hospitals which had grown up around it. In Britain, before the mid-1930s, criminology as a university-based, academic discipline simply did not exist.

<sup>39</sup> See, for instance, the works by Glover (1941, 1960), Aichhorn (1951), and Friedlander (1947).

## THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CRIMINOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE IN BRITAIN

The transformation of British criminology from a minor scientific specialism—the part-time activity of a few practitioners and enthusiasts—into an established academic discipline took place comparatively late, occurring some time between the mid-1930s and the early 1960s. Even then, it was by no means an inevitable or necessary development. Indeed, had it not been for the rise of Nazism in Germany, and the appointment of three distinguished European emigrés, Hermann Mannheim, Max Grunhut, and Leon Radzinowicz, to academic posts at elite British universities, British criminology might not have developed sufficient academic impetus to become an independent discipline during that period. But however contingently, the process of discipline formation did take hold in the post-war years, and its symbolic culmination occurred in October 1961 with the inauguration of a postgraduate course for the training of criminological researchers and teachers at the new Institute of Criminology at Cambridge. In the intervening years, the other concomitants of disciplinary status had gradually come into being, initially as the result of private initiatives, and then, in the late 1950s, with the support and funding of government.

Criminology teaching in the universities began to expand from the late 1930s onwards, catering to the needs of the fast-growing social work and probation professions and attracting a first generation of research students (such as John Spencer, Norval Morris, Tadeuz Grygier, and John Croft) who would go on to become important figures in the new discipline.<sup>40</sup> Cambridge University established a Department of Criminal Science in 1941, which sponsored research projects as well as a book series, and eventually formed the base upon which the Institute of Criminology was built. In 1950, Britain's first specialist criminology journal, the *British Journal of Delinquency* (renamed the *British Journal of Criminology* in 1960), was established as 'the official organ of the ISTD' and set about the task of moulding a coherent discipline out of the scores of small-scale research efforts dotted around the country. Editorials by Mannheim and his co-editors Edward Glover and Emmanuel Miller identified key aspects of an emerging research programme, and the journal carried extensive discussions of methodology and data sources as well as acting as a kind of bulletin board through which researchers could keep abreast of activities in the expanding field. In 1953, the ISTD also established the Scientific Group for the Discussion of Delinquency Problems, which acted as a forum for discussion for several years until younger members of the group—some of them with newly-created university posts in criminology—grew dissatisfied with the clinical and psychoanalytical emphasis

<sup>40</sup> According to the results of a survey carried out by Mannheim in the mid-1950s, twenty-one British universities claimed that criminology formed a part of their teaching curriculum, whether for undergraduate students or as a part of extension courses and diplomas taken by trainee social workers and probation officers (Mannheim 1957). From 1938 onwards, the ISTD was a centre for the University of London four-year Diploma Course in Social Studies, an evening course, of which the fourth year was devoted to criminology. Mannheim himself taught 'criminology as a separate subject in all its aspects' at the LSE from 1935 onwards.



of leading figures such as Glover and split off to found the more academically oriented British Society of Criminology. In 1956, Howard Jones published the first British criminology textbook, *Crime and the Penal System*, a work much influenced by the teachings of Mannheim at the London School of Economics. In its emphasis upon penological issues and its assumption of a reforming, welfarist stance it encapsulated an important and continuing strand of British criminological culture. (Such was the pace of change in this, the discipline's take-off phase, that the third edition of the book, appearing only nine years later in 1965, was described by an otherwise sympathetic reviewer as 'sadly out of date' (Taylor 1968).)

The Criminal Justice Act of 1948 provided for the regular allocation of Treasury funds for the purposes of criminological research, but in the years that followed only a tiny annual budget was actually made available. However, the 1950s saw the emergence of an explicit and continuing commitment by the British government to support criminological research, both as an in-house activity and as a university-based specialism. This, in effect, marked the point of convergence between criminology as an administrative aid and criminology as a scientific undertaking—the consolidation of the governmental and Lombrosian projects—and it represents a key moment in the creation of a viable, independent discipline of criminology in Britain. This new and closer relationship between government and criminological science not only endorsed criminology's claim to be a useful form of knowledge; it also gave official and financial backing to criminology's claim to scientific status and university recognition. Thus the Home Office proceeded to set up not just an infrastructure for policy-led research—which it did in 1957 with the opening of the Home Office Research Unit (see Lodge 1974)—but also an academic institute, the Cambridge Institute of Criminology, sited in a prestigious university, with the explicit task of undertaking scientific research and training recruits for the newly-founded discipline of criminology (see Radzinowicz 1988). As the 1959 White Paper *Penal Policy in a Changing Society* announced, 'the institute should be able, as no existing agency is in a position to do, to survey with academic impartiality . . . the general problem of the criminal in society, its causes, and its solution' (Home Office 1959).

This new-found compatibility between traditions which had often pulled in different directions had a number of sources. In part it was testimony to the degree to which the scientific strand of criminological research had modified its ambitions and adapted its terms to fit the institutional realities and policy concerns which so heavily influenced the market place of criminological ideas. In part it was attributable to the fact that research concerned to differentiate criminals from non-criminals, and especially those who would recidivate from those who would not, was thought to be important for the development of effective sentencing decisions (especially Borstal allocations) and decisions regarding early release. Thus, for example, the prediction research that claimed so much attention in the late 1950s could appear to satisfy both the needs of administration and the ends of science, in so far as these studies sought to identify offender characteristics that were highly correlated with subsequent offending. (In the event, the most effective prediction tables made little use of clinical information about the offender, and actually discredited to some extent the whole project of etiological research.) One might also suggest, however, that this

convergence between the search for useful knowledge and the search for scientific truth was actually more apparent than real, because, in the event, the research agenda pursued by the Cambridge Institute, at least in the early years, was heavily influenced by immediate policy needs. Indeed, for the most part, it was scarcely distinguishable from the in-house research of the Home Office—a fact that did not go uncriticized at the time.

If the emergence of a criminological discipline was the coming together of traditions of inquiry that had once been more distinct, it was also, and more immediately, the achievement of a few key individuals, backed by an alliance of interested organizations. These discipline-builders had to struggle with all sorts of resistance, but their decisive advantage was that they acted in a context in which government ministers and officials had become receptive to the idea that policy-making could be enhanced by the availability of systematic research and trained expertise. The shrewd political skills and institution-building energies of Leon Radzinowicz were particularly important (not least in persuading the Wolfson Foundation to fund the British discipline's first chair and provide the Cambridge Institute with the resources to become one of the world's leading centres of criminological work),<sup>41</sup> as was the influential teaching of Hermann Mannheim and the proselytizing work that he and the other ISTD members conducted in academic and practical circles. Similarly, the impressive body of research publications produced by these authors and others, such as Burt, Bowlby, Grunhut, Sprott, Mays, and Ferguson, created a strong case for the value of criminology as an academic subject.

The practical and educational benefits to be derived from establishing institutes and university departments of criminology were also canvassed by a number of influential political figures and associations. Senior government officials such as Alexander Paterson, Sir Lionel Fox, Sir Alexander Maxwell, and Viscount Templewood made public declarations about the need for criminology; Margery Fry and George Benson MP made representations to the Home Office to this effect; and at various times the Howard League, the Magistrates' Association, the British Psychological Society, the National Association for Mental Health, the Royal Medico-Psychological Association, and the United Nations European Seminar on Crime all added their weight to the campaign to obtain government sponsorship and university recognition for the subject (see Radzinowicz 1988, 1999). In the event, criminology's most influential supporter was R.A. Butler, who as Home Secretary in the late 1950s took a personal interest in the development of the subject, and who was instrumental in extending government funding for criminological research and in setting up the Cambridge Institute (see Butler 1974; Radzinowicz 1988, 1999).

The government's interest in sponsoring the creation of a viable criminological

<sup>41</sup> For Radzinowicz's own account of this period, see Radzinowicz 1999. It is worth pointing out that the standard claim made by those who canvassed the British government to support the development of criminology—namely, that the UK was trailing far behind other countries in the pursuit of criminological research—was subsequently shown to be quite false. Radzinowicz's empirical survey of the state of criminology around the world suggested that, with the establishment of the Cambridge Institute and the Home Office Research Unit, British criminology probably enjoyed more official support than that of any other country, with the possible exception of the USA. See Radzinowicz 1961.



enterprise was a combination of immediate penological concerns and broader conceptions of how the policy-making process ought to be organized. In the years immediately preceding the Second World War, a concern about increasing rates of juvenile offending prompted the Home Office to arrange a series of conferences and research projects in order to estimate the extent of the problem and identify its social and psychological roots. When, in the post-war years, the high wartime rates of delinquent behaviour failed to decline, the problem attracted extensive political and press attention and provided a compelling rationale for the promotion of criminological research. (In the years that followed, juvenile delinquency was to become a central topic in British criminology.) Similarly, the gradual development of a penal philosophy of 'treatment and training', centred upon the Borstal system and relying for its effectiveness upon accurate assessment and classification procedures, led to a growing demand for criminological knowledge and advice. More generally, the war-time experience of operational research and the utilization of expertise in various forms of strategic planning, together with the growing professionalization of administration and social work in the new welfare state, gradually convinced post-war governments of the value of research and expertise as a basis for social policy.<sup>42</sup> The same governmental mentality that looked to Beveridge and Keynes to solve the social and economic problems of the nation came to recognize criminology as a form of knowledge that should be integrated into the institutions of government. Criminology thus became an integral part of the process of 'social reconstruction', a small element in the post-war settlement which sought to secure stability and capitalist growth by means of welfare provision and social democratic management (see Mannheim 1946; Taylor 1981).

One might add that this tendency to appeal to expert, 'scientific' knowledge as a source of solutions to social and personal problems was increasingly apparent not just in government but also in the wider culture. As the prestige of the traditional moral and religious codes continued to wane, the new figure of the 'popular expert' began to appear more regularly on the radio and in the Press, teaching a mass audience how 'modern science' thought about age-old problems, including crime and delinquency.<sup>43</sup>

Once set in place, the component parts of the emergent discipline proceeded to establish the range of issues and research questions that was to characterize the subject. In hindsight, this research agenda is easily regarded as narrow and consensual, reflecting broad agreement about the importance of correctionalist aims and positivist methods and a traditional British bias against theoretical or sociological work (see Cohen 1981; Wiles 1976). However, there was actually a good deal of conflict and disagreement regarding the appropriate research agenda for the subject, and rather

<sup>42</sup> For a contemporary discussion of these developments, see National Association for Mental Health 1949. Ten years later, Barbara Wootton's review of the social sciences and their role in policy-making was severely critical of criminology's achievements in this respect (Wootton 1959). For a retrospective account, see Wiles 1976.

<sup>43</sup> See the transcripts of the BBC radio series on the causes of crime in *The Listener* of 1929 and 1934, especially the broadcasts by Cyril Burt on 'The Psychology of the Bad Child' (6 February 1929) and on 'The Causes of Crime' (2 May, 1934).

more diversity in intellectual style and policy orientation than the textbook histories have suggested. The major institutions in the newly created discipline—the Cambridge Institute and the Home Office Research Unit—were each, to differing degrees, tied into a framework of government-sponsored research which quickly assumed a distinctive pattern, although the Institute was home to other work as well, most notably Radzinowicz's monumental *History of English Criminal Law and its Administration* (1948–86), and was careful to maintain its claim to academic independence. Neither organization concerned itself closely with the development of clinical studies of the causes of crime or with the task of theory-building, preferring instead to pursue knowledge which would be more readily obtained and more immediately accessible to the policy process. As Radzinowicz argued in 1961, 'the attempt to elucidate the causes of crime should be put aside' in favour of more modest, descriptive studies which indicate the kinds of factors and circumstances with which offending is associated. Using an interdisciplinary approach and a diversity of methods, research was to be focused upon 'descriptive, analytical accounts of the state of crime, of the various classes of offenders, of the enforcement of criminal law [and] of the effectiveness of various measures of penal treatment' (Radzinowicz 1961: 175).

This approach, well characterized by George Vold (1958) as 'administrative criminology', attracted harsh criticism at the time from those more attached to criminology's scientific and explanatory ambitions, particularly the psychoanalysts at the ISTD and the group of sociological criminologists that was forming around Mannheim at the LSE—just as it would later be criticized again in the 1970s, this time by a new generation of criminologists more attracted to critical and sociological theory. But to figures such as Radzinowicz, trying to establish a fledgling and still precarious discipline, the concern was to produce useful knowledge and produce it quickly, rather than risk the failure of a more ambitious programme of etiological research, a programme which, in any case, would depend on the production of a more accurate and wide-ranging description of criminal phenomena (Radzinowicz 1988).

This pragmatic vision of the criminological enterprise was echoed by the 1959 White Paper, which argued that etiological research 'is confronted with problems which are immense both in range and complexity', that 'there are no easy answers to these problems and progress is bound to be slow', and that consequently emphasis should be placed instead upon 'research into the use of various forms of treatment and the measurement of their results, since this is concerned with matters that can be analysed more precisely' (Home Office 1959: 5). The Home Office Research Unit began its work squarely within this newly constructed framework of science-for-government, using the methodologies of social science to measure and improve the effectiveness of penal treatments and trying to harness the concepts and classifications of academic criminology to the work of administering criminal justice institutions. Nor was it surprising that the paradigmatic study which shaped much of the Unit's research in the first decade of its existence should be a prediction study—precisely the kind of work that formed a junction point between criminology's scientific and governmental concerns—and one, moreover, that focused on the Borstal, the British institution which more than any other embodied the correctionalist ideals of a scientific penology. The distinctive mixture of advanced statistical technique,



correctionalist classificatory concerns, and obvious policy relevance which characterized Mannheim and Wilkins' *Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training* (1955) came to be the hallmark of the Research Unit's work throughout the 1950s and 1960s (see Clarke and Cornish 1983).

## EPILOGUE

By the 1960s, then, one could say with confidence that a discipline of criminology had come into existence in Great Britain. Centred on the core institutions at Cambridge and London, but increasingly building a significant presence in universities and colleges throughout the country, the subject was well placed to benefit from the rapid expansion of higher education that occurred during this decade, and in the space of a few years criminology took on, rather suddenly, the character of a well-established discipline (see Rock 1988b). Indeed, such was the success of the new discipline in becoming a part of the academic scheme of things that many of its younger members seemed not to be aware of just how recently the battle for recognition had been won. Thus, in the critical writings that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, in which a new generation of criminologists mounted a radical assault on all that had gone before, one gets the sense that what is being attacked is a very powerful criminological establishment, rather than a *parvenu* and somewhat precarious subject still in the process of constituting itself.<sup>44</sup>

Gaining a secure place in the institutions of higher education had a major and unanticipated impact upon the discipline, so that no sooner had it become 'established' than it began to transform itself in significant ways. Many of the developments of the 1960s and 1970s—particularly the reassertion of theoretical ambition, the emergence of a strongly critical discourse, and a widespread dissatisfaction with criminology's relationship to correctionalist policies—are explicable in terms of a discipline adjusting to its new situation, pulled between the demands of policy relevance and the aspiration for academic credibility. Thus the discipline became not only more diversified, more specialized, more professional, and more self-critical in these years, it also became bitterly divided between those who sought to pursue the 'traditional' criminological agenda (in either its etiological or its administrative variant) and those associated with the National Deviancy Conference, founded at York in 1968, who were deeply critical of the medico-psychological assumptions, social democratic politics, and atheoretical pragmatism of what they termed 'positivist criminology' (see Cohen 1981; Wiles 1976).

<sup>44</sup> For examples of the radically self-critical criminology of this period, see Cohen 1971; Taylor and Taylor 1973; Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973; Taylor *et al.* 1975. In the context of these polemics—through which contemporary readers too often interpret the past—it is easy to forget that criminological writings had never been wholly uncritical of official practices. Most British criminological work has been framed by an ameliorist, social democratic politics, often sharply critical of state policies. Opposition to the death penalty was, for instance, a central concern for many criminologists in the period up to the 1960s. On the complex relationship of criminological knowledge to state power, see Garland 1992.

In those years, during which university funding seemed more secure than it would subsequently, and academic criminology momentarily enjoyed a degree of autonomy from government greater than at any time before or since, one of the repeated refrains of theoretical writing was that criminology had no epistemological warrant and that analytical considerations demanded that the discipline be dissolved into the broader concerns of sociology or social psychology. That such claims could be made, and made so forcefully, was a stark reminder of just how contingent was criminology's existence as a scientific subject. That they altogether failed to disturb the discipline and its continued expansion is perhaps a measure of the social and institutional forces that continue to underwrite the existence of British criminology.

### *Selected further reading*

The history of criminology is probably too complex to be captured in a single text, however compendious, but two collections—*The Origins and Growth of Criminology*, edited by Piers Beirne (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994) and *The History of Criminology*, edited by Paul Rock (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994)—do a good job of suggesting the main lines of descent and development. Other worthwhile collections include Paul Rock (ed.), *A History of British Criminology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), which features essays on the formation and contemporary character of the discipline; and the still useful *Pioneers in Criminology*, edited by H. Mannheim (London: Stevens, 1960).

Piers Beirne's *Inventing Criminology: Essays on the Rise of Homo Criminalis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993) rescues Beccaria, Quetelet, Guerry, Tarde, and Goring from the condescension of textbook caricatures. Despite decades of revisionist work of this kind, Leon Radzinowicz's essay *Ideology and Crime: A Study of Crime and its Social and Historical Context* (London: Heinemann, 1966) remains an illuminating introduction to the subject for undergraduates, and of course Radzinowicz's five-volume *History of the English Criminal Law and its Administration* (vols 1–4, London: Stevens; vol. 5, co-authored with Roger Hood, Oxford: Oxford University Press) is an indispensable source for anyone doing serious research in this field.

A number of studies follow the lead of Michel Foucault's classic work *Discipline and Punish* (London: Allen Lane, 1977) in analysing criminology as an apparatus of power/knowledge, linked into disciplinary and governmental institutions. Pasquale Pasquino's essay 'The Invention of Criminology: Birth of a Special Savior' (in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) and my article 'The Criminal and his Science' (*British Journal of Criminology* (1985), 25: 109–37) focus upon the emergence of the criminal delinquent as a new object of science and administration in nineteenth-century Europe; while my book *Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies* (Aldershot: Gower, 1985) shows how a developing criminological discourse spiralled in and out of the penal-welfare institutions that emerged in Britain at the start of the twentieth century. The Foucauldian account of criminology's history and its relation to power is reconsidered in my later article 'Criminological Knowledge and its Relation to Power: Foucault's Genealogy and Criminology Today' (*British Journal of Criminology* (1992), 32/4: 403–22) which argues for a more differentiated account of power, of criminology, and of the various ways in which they relate to one another.



There are several useful accounts of the institutional history of criminology in Britain, often written by insiders who played a key part in the development of the subject. Radzinowicz's memoir *Adventures in Criminology* (London: Routledge, 1999) is a hugely enjoyable read. Other accounts include Radzinowicz's history of *The Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Its Background and Scope* (London: HMSO, 1988), and *Crime Control in Britain: A Review of Policy Research*—a review of the development of Home Office edited by R.V.G. Clarke and Derek B. Cornish (Albany: State University of New York, 1983). Stanley Cohen, himself an important insider in a different strand of British criminology, offers a sociological analysis of post-war developments in 'Footprints on the Sand: A Further Report on Criminology and the Sociology of Deviance in Britain', in M. Fitzgerald, G. McLennan, and J. Pawson (eds), *Crime and Society: Readings in History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1981), and reflects upon the institutional and intellectual tensions that structured the field in the 1960s and 1970s. *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary* by Colin Sumner (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994) is an extended essay on the history of 'the sociology of deviance', a form of analysis that bears an oblique and often critical relationship to criminology. Many of the theoretical and political concerns themes that animate contemporary criminological research in Britain are discussed in David Nelken (ed.), *The Futures of Criminology* (London: Sage, 1994), and in Simon Holdaway and Paul Rock (eds), *Thinking About Criminology* (London: UCL Press, 1998).

Lastly, there are several works of social and intellectual history which explore particular aspects of criminology's past. The most important of these are Daniel Pick's *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848–c.1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Robert Nye's *Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Simon Cole's *Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Martin Wiener's *Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and Policy in England, 1830–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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